TOWARD ELIMINATING BARGAIN
BASEMENT JUSTICE: PROVIDING

INDIGENT DEFENDANTS WITH EXPERT
SERVICES AND AN ADEQUATE
DEFENSE
FRED WARREN BENNETT"

There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has.1
The methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called
the measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged.

I
INTRODUCTION

Almost four decades ago, in Griffin v. Illinois,3 Justice Hugo Black noted
the ancient problem of providing equal justice for the rich and for the poor.4
After citing the Bible5 and the Magna Charta,6 Justice Black noted that "[b]oth
equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire
judicial system-all people 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in
every American court'."7 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held

that the state had both an equal protection and a due process obligation to
provide free trial transcripts to indigent defendants appealing their convictions.8
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1. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
2. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
3. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
4. Id. at 17. Justice Black, noting Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), stated rhetorically that
defendants who are unable to pay court costs in advance should not be denied the right to plead not
guilty or to defend themselves in court. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17.
5. Griffin,351 U.S. at 16 (citing Leviticus 19:15: "Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment; thou
shall not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt
thou judge thy neighbor.").
6. Id. The Magna Charta, executed in 1215, provided:
To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or justice .... No free man
shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed; nor
shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land.
7. Id. at 17 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
8. Id. at 18-19.
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In Griffin, the Supreme Court began to provide greater procedural
protections, in the form of expert services, for indigent defendants at the state
level. Prior to Griffin, some, but not all, states denied indigents a free transcript
for appeal;9 procedural protections had been limited largely to the provision of
counsel, and even then only in specified circumstances.' ° Gradually, the right
of an indigent defendant to appointed counsel became clear and systematized."'
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts
began to focus on providing for the poor the "meaningful access to justice"' 2
and the "basic tools of an adequate defense" 3 which indigents so desperately
need, 4 including the right to court-appointed counsel at the state level 5 and
expert services.
16
Although the Supreme Court began as early as 1932 in Powell v. Alabama
to define the boundaries of an indigent's right to appointed counsel, the Court
decided very few cases in the area of providing experts and expert services for
the indigent. In the only Supreme Court case before Ake v. Oklahoma7 on
the matter of state-funded psychiatric assistance for an indigent defendant,
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,8 the Court held that the denial of a motion
by an indigent defendant for a pretrial psychiatric consultation did not constitute
a denial of due process.' 9 Prior to Ake, some state courts erroneously cited
Baldi to justify a complete denial of psychiatric defense assistance to indigents
who requested but could not otherwise afford such assistance.' ° The better
9. Id. at 19.
10. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that in capital cases the 14th
Amendment requires intensified protection for the indigent and that failure to provide counsel for a
rape defendant was a denial of fundamental fairness).
11. Powell did not entitle all indigent defendants to counsel. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938), the right of an indigent to appointed counsel was established under the Sixth Amendment. In
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court held that the sixth amendment requirement that indigent
defendants receive appointed counsel in certain federal criminal proceedings did not apply to the states
because it was not a fundamental right essential to a fair trial. Id. at 471-73.
12. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (holding that defendant has a right to a state-funded
psychiatrist if insanity is a significant factor at the trial).
13. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
14. See United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting) ("The best
lawyer in the world cannot competently defend an accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing
evidence crucial to the defense ....
In such circumstances, if the government does not supply the
funds, justice is denied the poor-and represents but an upper-bracket privilege."), vacated, 352 U.S.
565 (1957).
15. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the right to counsel at trial became a
"fundamental right," meaning states must provide counsel for indigent defendants. The Court noted
that the "right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to
fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours." Id. at 344.
16. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
18. 344 U.S. 561 (1953). In Baldi, the defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and then
presented testimony on an insanity defense at a later hearing. Id. at 564.
19. Id. at 568.
20. See, for example, Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), superseded by statute
as stated in Dutten v. Dixon, 757 P.2d 376 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), overruled in part by Cartwright v.
State, 778 P.2d 479 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1015 (1990), and Taylor v. State, 192
S.E.2d 249 (Ga. 1972), which relied on Baldi to find no error in a trial court's refusal to appoint a
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interpretation of Baldi holds that because the defendant had been provided with
sufficient psychiatric defense assistance, he was not constitutionally entitled to
further assistance at state expense.21
The right of an indigent defendant to expert services may well have been
presaged by Griffin. The development of Griffin and its progeny,' as well as
the growth of the right of an indigent to counsel provided by Gideon v.
Wainright2 and Douglas v. California, eventually would be extended to

provide an indigent with a right to experts and expert services. The landmark
decision providing indigent defendants access to psychiatric expert services, and
arguably other types of expert services, came in 1985 with Ake v. Oklahoma'
In Ake, the Court held that if a defendant's sanity at the time of the offense is
to be a "significant factor" at the trial of an indigent defendant, the indigent has
a right to the assistance of a state-supplied psychiatrist to aid in the defense. 26
Despite the Supreme Court decisions in Griffin and Ake, and statutory
provisions providing expert services for an indigent, 7 it remains unclear
whether an indigent will be provided with the expert services necessary for an
adequate defense.'8 This article examines the line of cases that provide expert

psychiatrist requested by the indigent defendant. See also Martin v. Commonwealth, 271 S.E.2d 123
(Va. 1980), in which the Supreme Court of Virginia, citing Baldi as its authority, upheld the trial court's
denial of a state-paid investigator for an indigent defendant.
21. See Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), affd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
In Bush, the court held that an indigent defendant planning a defense of insanity at a contested trial
(Baldi, by contrast, pled guilty and complained later of ineffective assistance of counsel) was denied due
process under the 14th Amendment when his request to the trial court for a psychiatrist to assist his
defense was denied. Id. at 565.
22. Subsequent cases further delineated the bounds of the indigent defendant's or prisoner's right
to a free transcript as an expert service. See, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193 (1971) (holding
that an indigent defendant has an equal protection right to a free transcript for appeal); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 488 (1963) (holding that access to a free transcript for purposes of appeal
cannot be denied to indigent defendants).
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have
the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial that must be observed by the
states under the 14th Amendment).
24. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that under the 14th Amendment a defendant is entitled as of right
to a court-appointed attorney on an appeal). Douglas was decided on the same day as Gideon. The
Douglas decision was based on the equal protection language that runs throughout Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
25. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). For a fuller discussion of Ake, see infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
26. 470 U.S. at 74. The Court stated:
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of
the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State
provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise
afford one.
Id.
27. The statutory focus of this article will be on the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e) (1988), which provides for expert services in federal courts for those defendants who cannot
afford them. Various state statutes will also be considered. See infra part V.B.
28. For discussions of the pre-Ake treatment of expert services by the courts, see Ephraim Margolin
& Allen Wagner, The Indigent CriminalDefendant and Defense Services: A Search for Constitutional
Standards,24 HASTINGS L.J. 647 (1973); Dennis W. Alexander, Comment, Assistance in Addition to
Counsel for Indigent Defendants; The Need For; The Lack Of; The Right To, 16 VILL. L. REv. 323
(1970); Philip Fahringer, Note, An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to a Psychiatric
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services for the indigent and have as a consistent theme the "meaningful access
to justice."'29 Particular emphasis will be given to the need for nonpsychiatric
experts, in an effort to show that nonpsychiatric experts are a basic "tool of an
adequate defense"30 that should be provided for those who cannot afford to
retain such experts.31
Part II of this article discusses the historical background and the importance
of providing an "adequate defense."32 Part III addresses substantive and
procedural concerns and examines the standard for appointment of psychiatric
and nonpsychiatric experts. Part IV considers the changing role of the expert
and the importance of the expert as a member of the defense team. Part V
discusses federal and state legislation providing expert services for the indigent
and considers the problem of imposing statutory limitations on the compensation available to the expert appointed under federal or state legislation. Part
VI discusses how courts should interpret Ake to effectuate its meaning and
concludes with a proposal of suggested statutory language for the authorization
of defense services.
II
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO EXPERT SERVICES FOR

THE POOR

A. The Critical Importance of an "Adequate Defense"
Since as early as Griffin in 1956, the Supreme Court has focused on
identifying and providing for the indigent defendant the "tools of an adequate
defense."33 If, as the Court has declared, fundamental fairness entitles indigent
defendants to "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the
adversary system,"' then, as a corollary, the idea that indigent defendants
must be provided with the same essential
services (such as experts) available to
35
the nonindigent becomes axiomatic.
The Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that indigent defendants are
not entitled to state or federal resources to duplicate the defense services
Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 481; Dean C. Gramlich, Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent
Defendant. Griffin and its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REV. 394 (1964).
29. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
30. Id. (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
31. Id.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1988) (codifying the right to an adequate defense).
33. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). In Britt, while affirming the defendant's
conviction because of a lack of showing of a need for a trial transcript, the Court held, consistent with
Griffin, that an indigent defendant must be provided with the basic tools of an adequate defense or
appeal when other prisoners or defendants may be able to purchase such tools. 1d; see also Ake, 470
U.S. 68.
34. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
35. Writing for the majority in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), Justice Black wrote: "There
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."
Id at 19. Justice Black must have foreseen how difficult it would be to solve this rhetorical problem.
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(expert or otherwise) that a wealthier person can buy.36 Most lower federal
courts have enthusiastically rejected the equal protection and due process
arguments brought by indigent defendants seeking the services that paying
clients can buy for themselves. In Williams v. Collins,3 7 for example, the
defendant was convicted of capital murder. The court rejected the defendant's
claim that the denial of an investigator constituted a deprivation of equal
protection and due process. The court dismissively noted it is "well settled" that
a state is not required "to pay for the same assistance that a wealthier defendant
might buy."38 Comparatively few courts have found differences based on
financial status "repugnant to the Constitution" when the vindication of legal
rights is at issue.39
Lower federal courts often adhere to Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Griffin.' Griffin's baseline holding, to which the plurality and
concurrence subscribed, generally requires that once a state makes an appeal
available to criminal defendants, it must provide them with a free transcript if
they cannot afford one.41
Other decisions have expanded an indigent's right to an adequate defense.
For example, indigent defendants need not pay a fee before they file a notice
of appeal from their conviction.42 Of particular importance to an adequate
defense are the rights to assistance of counsel at trial43 and the assistance of
counsel on the first direct appeal." Clearly the mere appointment of counsel
is not sufficient. It is also essential that once counsel is appointed for an
indigent defendant, the assistance rendered is effective.45 In addition,
fundamental to the necessary expansion of the components of an adequate
defense are experts and expert services, both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric.'
One commentator argues that because criminal defendants are entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel, the defendants are therefore entitled to the kinds

36. Ross, 417 U.S. at 612. See also Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Griffin, where he
noted that the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute matching by the government of the
resources of defendants with means.
37. 16 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 1994).
38. Id at 637 (relying on Ake, 470 U.S. 68). The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure placed a $500
limit on reimbursement of costs for court-appointed investigators. Curiously, although getting to the
merits of the case, the Court of Appeals noted that the investigator in this particular case cost $900 and
that it was the policy of the sitting judges in habeas cases to reimburse in full; so, in fact, there was no
harm to the defendant.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Devlin, 13 F.3d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Roberts v. LaVallee,
389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967)).
40. See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
41. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
42. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
43. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
44. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
45. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685
(1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
46. See John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The
ConstitutionalMandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1326 (1986) (arguing that even when
an indigent defendant is provided with counsel, justice is not always done).
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of services the defense attorneys would tend to employ were their clients not
indigent.47
Through cases such as Griffin and Gideon, the Supreme Court considerably
broadened the constitutional mandate of an adequate defense. The Griffin
decision, providing transcripts to indigent criminal defendants for first appeals
as of right, is an early precursor to the Court's formal pronouncement in Ake
regarding the necessity of psychiatric experts in the presentation of an adequate
defense."
Ake, although sometimes problematic and inadequate, was and is an opinion
that grounds for the indigent defendant the right to expert services as part of
an adequate defense. The Court held that the "elementary principle [(the right
of a defendant to have a fair opportunity to present his defense)], grounded in
significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of
fundamental fairness,"' 9 required the state to provide an indigent defendant
with a psychiatrist to aid in his defense.' If justice cannot be equal where
"simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to
participate meaningfully [in his defense],"'" the principle is broad enough to
encompass various types of nonlegal expertise as essential to an adequate
defense, therefore a meaningful defense.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has extended Ake
to include the appointment of a nonpsychiatric expert for a defendant in a
capital case when denial of the expert would result in an unfair trial.5 Such
nonpsychiatric experts should be available to provide an adequate defense when
satisfies standards similar to those for psychiatrists set out in
a defendant
53
Ake.
B. Griffin v. Illinois and Ake v. Oklahoma: The Holdings
1. Griffin v. Illinois. In Griffin v. Illinois,5 the defendant was convicted
of armed robbery in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois.55 Griffin's
request for a free trial transcript for use on his appeal was denied by the trial
court without a hearing.56 A petition for post-conviction relief to obtain the

47. John F. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutionaland
Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. GiN. L. REv. 574 (1982).
48. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
49. Id. at 76.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
For a fuller discussion of Little, see infra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
53. Husske v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 331 (Va. App. 1994) (extending Ake to require that
defendant have access to expert assistance to respond to prosecution's DNA expert); see also infra part
III (discussing the standards for appointment of experts).
54. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
55. Id at 13.
56. Id at 15.
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trial transcript was also denied and affirmed on appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court.
On certiorari to the state supreme court, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted the importance that there be "no invidious discriminations between
persons and different groups of persons.95 8 Since the central issue in the case
was whether the state must provide a transcript for an indigent on the first
appeal as of right, 9 the defendant argued that discrimination based on
financial means amounted to invidious discrimination.' Griffin came down on
the side of indigent defendants, holding that a transcript must be provided to
indigent defendants at state expense.61 As an early case providing expert
services for an indigent, Griffin drew criticism from the start, beginning with the
concurring Justice.62 Griffin remains intact largely because of the Supreme
Court's subsequent treatment of the case in Britt v. North Carolina' and
6
because of the language in the Criminal Justice Act.
In United States v. Devlin,6 5 the district court denied the defendant a free
transcript of his suppression hearing. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that
defense counsel should not have to rely on notes or memory to impeach
witnesses and that the transcript was needed to place the defendant on an equal
footing.' Recent cases such as Devlin indicate that a transcript is a basic tool
due the indigent defendant even when requested for a proceeding other than a
first appeal as of right.67

57. Id
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. at 15.
60. In noting protection from invidious discrimination, the Court relied on the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 18 (citing Dowd v. United States ex reL Cook,
340 U.S. 206, 208 (1951) and Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)).
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 26 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("In arriving at a new principle, the judicial process is not
impotent to define its scope and limits."); see also Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Ross is
significant because it held that the state has a higher duty to provide for the defense needs of an
indigent at trial than on discretionary appeal, where it had no duty to provide for such needs. Id. at
610. Thus, as an extension of the Griffin reasoning, the Ross decision protects the rights of indigents
to expert services at the critical trial level.
63. 404 U.S. 226 (1971). Although the Britt Court affirmed the defendant's conviction in a narrow
holding that an adequate alternative to the trial transcript had been available to the defendant, the
Court declared that the Griffin line of cases establishes the mandate that indigent defendants be
provided with the "basic tools" for a defense and that a transcript is such a tool. Id. at 227. The Court
noted two factors critical to a determination of the need for a free transcript: (1) the value of the
transcript in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought and (2) the availability of
alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript. Id.
64. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1988), covers the defendant's right
to a transcript as an expert service under the phrase "other services" and provides for its payment by
the state. See infra part V.A.1.
65. 13 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1994).
66. Id. at 1364.
67. The court noted that since prosecution witnesses testified at the suppression hearing, the
transcript would be required for impeachment. Id. The court also construed the transcript as a "basic
tool" required under equal protection. Id. at 1363 (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. at 227
(1971)).
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Federal courts have scrupulously applied Griffin through Britt,' or have
relied upon statutes requiring the provision of transcripts.69 Generally the
emphasis of the courts is on whether the dictates of fairness require that the
indigent defendant be provided with a free transcript and whether this would
help level the playing field between the indigent and the government. 0
However, many 71cases seem to apply grants of free transcripts for an appeal on
an ad hoc basis.

As for retrials, in King v. White,' the district court held that whether the
indigent defendant handling his case pro se was entitled to a transcript of the
first trial depended on whether there was an "adequate alternative."73 In this
case, the court held that the defendant had been repeatedly offered a
continuance in order to obtain the transcript. The continuance, the court held,
would have enabled the defendant to obtain the transcript if the defendant had
accepted.74 Thus, there was no error when the defendant declined the court's
offer.
2. Ake v. Oklahoma. In Ake v. Oklahoma,75 Justice Marshall began the
Court's discussion of the equal protection and due process rights of an indigent
with a citation to Griffin.76 The Court held that the state must provide access
to psychiatric assistance for the indigent defendant who has made a preliminary
showing that his "sanity at the time of the offense" is likely to be a "significant
factor" at trial.77 In this case, defendant Ake raised an insanity defense to his
capital murder charge prior to trial.7 Ake's counsel made a motion requesting

68. See, e.g., United States v. Pulido, 879 F.2d 1255, 1256-58 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding the denial of
an indigent defendant's request for a copy of a transcript of mistrial prior to second trial to be
reversible error); Tague v. Puckett, 874 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that witnesses' statements
and limited access to the court reporter during the second trial do not provide adequate substitutes for
a transcript).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 157 (6th Cir. 1978) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e)(1) (1988)); United States v. Mosiman, 604 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (stating that
a criminal defendant's right to a transcript is governed by statute although denying the present request).
70. See United States v. Bad, 750 F.2d 1169, 1182 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that an indigent defendant
should be able to obtain daily transcripts at government expense when the government was receiving
daily transcripts).
71. See Colon v. Smith, 723 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that the defendant suffered no
harm from being denied daily trial transcripts where the trial would be a "relatively simple one" and
where the court reporter could read back statements).
72. 839 F. Supp. 718 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
73. Id at 723 (interpreting the adequate alternative requirement as required by the second prong
of Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) as explained in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 n.8
(1971)).
74. Id
75. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
76. Id. at 76.
77. Id. at 83.
78. Id. at 72.
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psychiatric assistance. Relying on United States ex. rel. Smith v. Baldi,79 the
trial court denied the motion.
At trial, none of Ake's expert witnesses could testify to Ake's sanity or lack
thereof at the time of the offense.8 Thus, Ake had no expert witnesses who
could raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecution's evidence of his sanity.
The jury found Ake sane and guilty on all counts, and, as a result, Ake was
given the death penalty."1 On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the conviction. The court rejected the argument that Ake was
an indigent defendant who was entitled to state-funded psychiatric assistance in
the capital case as a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.8 2
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.8 3 The
Court decided the case on the requirement that the state provide "meaningful
access to justice,"' premised on the Court's goal to ensure that indigent
defendants have "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within
the adversary system.""5 According to the Ake Court, "the state must, at a
minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense."8 6 Ake stands for a guarantee" of competent
psychiatric assistance88 to accomplish the above purposes.89 The Court's
heavy reliance on the rationale of evenhanded and equal justice for the indigent
leaves open the implication that psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts are
indispensable' in capital and noncapital cases and should not be so difficult
for indigents to secure. 91
79. 344 U.S. 561 (1953) (holding that the state's refusal to appoint an independent expert did not
deny the indigent his due process rights).
80. Ake, 470 U.S. at 72.
81. Id. at 73.
82. Ake v. Oklahoma, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
83. Ake, 470 U.S. at 87.
84. Id. at 77.
85. Id. (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
86. Id at 83.
87. See Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 644 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the good fortune of
finding a psychologist who will volunteer is not an adequate substitute for an indigent's right to a
defense psychologist under Ake).
88. In Clisby v. Jones, 907 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir.), vacated en banc, 920 F.2d 720 (11th Cir. 1990), the
court, relying on Ake, noted that indigents ought to have the same kind of assistance as the wealthy as
a matter of fairness but that both types of defendants may get negligent help and that malpractice issues
are separate from right to expert issues. Id. at 1050.
89. Recent court decisions that have employed Ake generally hold that where the defendant
adequately satisfies the threshold showing of mental condition as a substantial factor, the guarantee of
psychiatric assistance is implicated. See, e.g., Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the defendant's showing was thorough and ample to establish the requisite close question regarding
the defendant's mental condition and that the trial court's denial of funds for an expert on the effects
of battered women's syndrome prevented the defendant from presenting evidence which fairly reflected
on her mental condition and affirming the granting of habeas corpus relief).
90. See infra part IV.
91. For a full treatment of the Ake decision and for further background, see Paul S. Appelbaum,
In the Wake of Ake: The Ethics of Expert Testimony in an Advocate's World, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 15 (1987); Karen Frances Clark, CriminalProcedure-Narrowingthe Rights of Future
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C. Caldwell v. Mississippi: Supreme Court Limitations on Expert Services
for the Indigent
The Ake decision did not specifically create a scheme for the appointment
of nonpsychiatric experts in capital or noncapital cases. The Court's reliance on
the Fourteenth Amendment's "guarantee of fundamental fairness"92 and its
determination to provide the indigent with "access to the raw materials integral
to the building of an effective defense" 93 would seem to require consistent

application to nonpsychiatric experts in both capital and noncapital cases where
a defendant's "fair opportunity to present his defense" 94 needs to be assured.
Prior to Ake, lower courts had ruled that nonpsychiatric experts were
Immediately following the Ake
constitutionally available to indigents. 95

decision, however, lower courts often narrowed Ake to its facts, limiting the
opportunity to use state-funded expert witnesses to psychiatric experts
indigent's
96
only.

In Caldwell v. Mississippi,97 decided shortly after Ake, Caldwell was charged

with capital murder. Prior to trial, Caldwell asked for the appointment of a
criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert. The trial court
denied his requests. 98 The state supreme court affirmed the denial of experts
because the requests were accompanied by no showing as to their reasonableness.99 Given that Caldwell "offered little more than undeveloped assertions"
that the requested assistance of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and

Indigent CriminalDefendants in the Name of Due Process, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 417 (1986); Donald
H. Dubia, The Defense Right to PsychiatricAssistance in Light of Ake v. Oklahoma, ARMY LAW. 15
(1987); David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach for the
Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REv. 763 (1990); Stephen Rachlin, From ImpartialExpert to Adversary in the Wake
of Ake, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25 (1988); C. Robert Showalter & W. Lawrence Fitch,
Objectivity and Advocacy in Forensic Psychiatry After Ake v. Oklahoma, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 177
(1987); Susan S. Brown, Note, After Ake: Implementing the Tools of an Adequate Defense, 7 PACE L.
REV. 201 (1986); Mark P. Goodman, Note, The Right to a PartisanPsychiatricExpert Might Indigency
Preclude Insanity?, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 703 (1986); Marion Ty Rutter, Note, Ake v. Oklahoma: A
Question of Experts, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 385 (1987); Michael James Todd, Note, Criminal
Procedure-DueProcessand IndigentDefendants: Extending FundamentalFairnessto Include the Right
to Expert Assistance, 29 HOw. L. 609 (1986); West, supra note 46; A. Michelle Willis, Note,
NonPsychiatricExpert Assistance and the Requisite Showing of Need.- A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake
CriminalJustice System, 37 EMORY L.J. 995 (1988).
92. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
93. Id. at 77.
94. Id. at 76.
95. See, e.g., Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980) (forensic pathologist); People v.
1966) (handwriting expert).
Watson, 221 N.E.2d 645 (Il.
96. See Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) ("[T]here is
nothing contained in the Ake decision to suggest that the United States Supreme Court was addressing
anything other than psychiatrists and the insanity defense.").
97. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
98. Id. at 323 n.1.
99. Id
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a ballistics expert would be beneficial, the U.S. Supreme Court found no
deprivation of due process in the trial court's denial of these requests.'
Recent court decisions, such as Moore v. Kemp, °1 relying on Caldwell,
note that if the requisite standard of need were shown with respect to expert
requests, nonpsychiatric experts would be granted on the same basis that
psychiatric experts are granted in Ake. In Moore, the court interpreted Caldwell
and Ake to mean that a defendant, in order to get a state-funded expert, must
show that a reasonable probability exists that an expert would be of assistance
to the defense and that denial thereof would result in a fundamentally unfair
trial." The Supreme Court still has not clearly addressed the need to appoint
a nonpsychiatric expert for an indigent defendant.
III
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL CONCERNS: THE STANDARD FOR
APPOINTMENT OF EXPERTS FOR THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT

A. Little v. Armontrour The Importance of the Nonpsychiatric Expert
In Caldwell,"° the Court "did not reject Caldwell's argument that an
expert may be constitutionally required on issues other than sanity,"" ° but
instead stated that the petitioner had not presented a strong enough case.1"
For example, Caldwell did not specifically explain why the ballistics expert was
°6 Statet 17
necessary, but he nonetheless baldly asserted the need for aid.'
and federal" ° courts subsequent to Caldwell have noted the importance of
nonpsychiatric experts for an indigent and, as a result, have found defendants
to be entitled to nonpsychiatric experts upon a valid showing of reasonable
need.
Unfortunately, many courts focus on the specificity of the showing of need.
In United States v. Gadison,1 ° for example, the defendant filed a motion under
18 U.S.C. section 3006A(e)(1) for the appointment of a private investigator at
government expense. The circuit court upheld denial of the request, noting that
counsel had not "ferreted out information through his own efforts which was

100. Id.; see infra part III (discussing the standard of need).
101. 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
102. Id. at 712.
103. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
104. Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1104 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323
n.1).
105. Id.
106. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323 n.1.
107. State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1987) (expert for defense of intoxication); see also
People v. Dickerson, 606 N.E.2d 762,765 (Il. 1992) (handwriting expert); In re Cannady, 600 A.2d 459
(N.J. 1991) (expert on battered woman syndrome); McBride v. State, 838 S.W.2d 248, 250-52 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (investigator/chemist to inspect cocaine).
108. See Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210
(1988).
109. 8 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1993).
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likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence."'' 0 To justify the
authorization of an investigator, the court held, there must be a showing of true
"specificity" that the investigator is necessary."
Little v. Armontrout is the leading federal case focusing on the importance of nonpsychiatric experts. In Little, the victim was raped in her apartment
by an assailant who wore one of the victim's blouses on his head.'
The
victim did not inform the attending policewoman but later told her sister that
the blouse slipped from the assailant's face for between two and sixty seconds,
allowing her to see the man's face." 4 Two days after the attack, the victim
was hypnotized by a police officer in the hope that the victim's memory of the
assailant would be enhanced. The victim subsequently identified
Little from a
1 15
photo array and picked him out of a lineup as her assailant.
At trial, the only substantial issue was identification of the assailant.16
Witnesses testified," 7 and the jury found Little guilty of rape and sentenced
him to twenty-five years in jail." s The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed." 9
Little argued that he could not prove that improper suggestion had prejudiced
his case because the public defender's office could not afford to hire its own
hypnosis expert. 2° The state court's response was that a "resourceful lawyer"
would not be helpless
in obtaining expert information at a nearby university at
21
little or no expense.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court based its rationale on
Ake and Caldwell and in an oft-quoted passage"2 declared:
There is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric
expert& The question in each case must be not what field of science or expert

110. Id. at 191.
111. Id. The defendant had been charged with conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of
cocaine base. The court focused on factors such as a failure to show that prospective witnesses existed
that would make the court-appointed investigator necessary, a difficult reasoning to accept when the
very purpose of an investigator may be to locate witnesses who exist but are unknown.
112. 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
113. Id. at 1241.
114. Id.

115. Id. at 1242.
116. Id.
117. A maintenance man working in the area the night of the assault testified that he saw a man
resembling Little in the area but, under cross-examination, admitted he was unsure of the identification.
Because of the maintenance man's doubt about his own ability to make a correct identification, he was
hypnotized. Defendant Little and several alibi witnesses testified that Little was 78 miles away in
another town when the crime took place. Id.
118. Id.
119. State v. Little, 674 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985).
120. Little, 835 F.2d at 1242.
121. Little, 674 S.W.2d at 544.
122. In Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1104 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Little, 835 F.2d at 1243),
the court noted that no circuit has disagreed with the principle espoused by the Eighth Circuit that the
question of expert assistance should turn on "how important the scientific issue is in the case."

Page 95: Winter 1995]

DEFENDING INDIGENTS

knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the case, and
how much help a defense expert could have given.123

The court concluded that Little demonstrated that an expert in hypnosis would
have substantially aided in his defense and that the denial of an expert "would
and did have a material impact on his trial."'" The Little decision, holding
that the nonpsychiatric experts were required for an "adequate defense," was
clearly influenced by the principle of fundamental fairness upon which Ake is
grounded."2
State courts have also grappled with the use of nonpsychiatric experts. In
Ohio v. Wolf," the defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, for
enclosing his wife in a plastic bag after an argument and allowing her to
asphyxiate. In an unpublished opinion, the apellate court upheld the trial
court's denial of the defendant's request for an investigator 27 and a laboratory
expert. 28 At trial, the defendant had also sought a pathologist based on the
absence of factual support in the autopsy that asphyxiation was the cause of
death. The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction on the
aggravated murder count of the indictment due to the trial court's refusal to
provide an expert pathologist. The appellate court held that the defendant must
be provided with the opportunity to establish that the death did not physiologically occur as the prosecution said it did and that only an expert pathologist
could competently present evidence on how superficial blows to the head can
cause death. 129 The court noted that an expert may have testified that
sufficient force was used by the defendant' ' to
merit a finding that he acted in
"sudden passion" or a "sudden fit of rage. 1 30
With nonpsychiatric experts as with psychiatric experts, courts rigorously
impose the requirement that there be more than a mere possibility of assistance

123. Little, 835 F.2d at 1243. The court went on to say that no line could be drawn for due process
purposes that would distinguish between capital and noncapital cases. The defendant's interest in
staying alive is greater than avoiding a prison term, but the interest of the defendant in avoiding the
prison term still outweighs the state's interest in avoiding a relatively small expense. Id.
124. 1I at 1244.
125. As one commentator has noted, Ake's nonresponsiveness to other types of experts may create
the necessary limitation of Ake to its facts, the right to a psychiatrist for an insanity defense. See West,
supra note 46, at 1338. The author also notes that given the importance of nonpsychiatric experts to
accurate fact finding, the Ake reasoning requires that experts be made available to indigent defendants
as well as the prosecution when they appear reasonably necessary to assistcounsel in their preparation.
Id. at 1340 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966)).
126. No. 91-L-096, 1992 WL 366985 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1992); see also, Terry v. Rees, 985 F.2d
283 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding denial of a pathologist denied the defendant the opportunity to present an
effective defense, but concluding the denial was harmless error).
127. The court denied the investigator on the ground that only one victim and one defendant were
involved, and the magnitude of the case, therefore, did not warrant the expert. Wolf, 1992 WL 366985,
at *4.
128. Defendant sought an independent analysis of the truck. He alleged his wife died as the result
of blows and not asphyxiation caused by being placed in a plastic bag; had asphyxiation been the cause,
the victim would have defecated in the truck. Id
129. Id. at *5.
130. Id.
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from the expert. In Yohey v. Collins,131 the court noted that an expert such
as a ballistics expert should be provided only if the evidence is "both critical to
the conviction and subject to varying expert opinion."' 32 A lack of such
showing on the part of the defendant warranted a denial of the expert.'33
B. The "Significant Factor at Trial" Test: A Showing of Need
On the one hand, in United States v. Bagley,"3 Justice Marshall's dissenting
opinion admitted that the Supreme Court had not required the appointment of
investigators (as nonpsychiatric experts) "who will assure that the defendant has
an opportunity to discover every existing piece of helpful evidence."' 35 On the
other hand, however, Ake held that when the defendant's sanity was "likely to
be a significant factor at trial," a psychiatric expert must be appointed for an
indigent defendant.'36
Federal courts have relied heavily on the "significant factor" language of
Ake when reviewing requests for psychiatric assistance. 117 Requests for
psychiatric assistance are usually denied for lack of a showing of mental state
as a significant factor." s Few published opinions grant reversals based on the
trial court's failure to appoint a psychiatric expert. 39 Since Ake, the courts
have emphasized that the burden rests on the defendant seeking the expert
service to satisfy the court that the relevant expert testimony is necessary to
present an adequate defense."
The decision to appoint the expert is

131. 985 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1993).
132. Id at 227 (internal quotations omitted).
133. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the court's denial of experts rendered
counsel ineffective by forcing his attorney to choose whether or not to use his own money for a defense.
Id.
134. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
135. Id. at 695 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).
137. See, e.g., Clark v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 1561, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982
(1988) (holding that a murder defendant had no constitutional right to appointment of a psychiatric
expert to make confidential reports to the defendant's counsel where no showing was made that sanity
would be a significant issue at trial); Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 964 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1029 (1988), (Defendant "never said, much less articulated a factual basis for believing, that
his sanity at the time of the offense would be a significant factor at trial," and counsel made no mention
of the defendant's mental state.); see also Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 710-12 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1054 (1987) (holding that to demonstrate constitutional necessity, the defendant must show
not only that the expert would assist the defense, but also that denial of the expert would result in an
unfair trial, and that the defendant must furnish the court with specifics about the State's case and
provide a substantial basis for any defense for which he desires the expert's help).
138. See, e.g., Volanty v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989); United
States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 637-39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 (1989); Cartwright v.
Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986).
139. See Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 642-45 (11th Cir. 1991) (overturning the state trial court's
failure to provide psychiatric assistance when an ample showing of a significant insanity defense was
made); see also Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 335-40 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that even though
defendant seeking to establish a defense of entrapment by estoppel had an I.Q. of only about 75, the
burden is still on the defendant to show that the services of a psychological expert are "necessary to
an adequate defense" (citing United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 376 (10th Cir. 1986))); United
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completely within the discretion of the judge.14 An appellate court can
reverse the decision to appoint an expert only if the trial court abused its discretion."
Some courts appear to be blending economic arguments with the standard
for a showing of need. In Riley v. Snyder,4 3 for example, the defendant was
charged with conspiracy and murder in a liquor store robbery. The defendant
sought appointment of an investigator to establish corroborating testimony of
witnesses to establish an alibi. The court reasoned that the simplicity of the
defense and prospective ability of counsel to locate witnesses negated the need
for the investigator."4 However, the court also indicated that it would simply
be more economical for the defendant to hire a private investigator without
providing a basis for this conclusion.
State courts have similarly relied on the Ake "significant factor at trial" test
in granting expert services. 45 However, state courts also have affirmed trial
court denials of psychiatric services at state expense because no preliminary
showing of need was made by the defense."4 Some state courts have applied
rationales that seem to conflict with the mandates of Britt and Ake, which
require the state to provide the indigent defendant with the resources necessary
to meet a prosecution by the state. 47
The state courts have struggled to refine Ake's threshold requirement with
widely varied results. Some courts hold that both Ake and due process require
the appointment of experts prior to trial when it is "reasonably necessary.""
Other courts rely on the discretion of the trial judge, who has the ability to
observe the defendant firsthand. 49

States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1987).
141. Nichols, 21 F.3d at 1018.
142. Id
143. 840 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Del. 1993).
144. Id at 1036. The court reasoned that there had been no showing that defense counsel would
not be able to locate possible witnesses. The court also adopted the Delaware Supreme Court
reasoning that "the defense was a simple alibi .... Neither party relied upon any extensive scientific
or psychiatric testimony." Id. (citing Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1017 (Del. 1985)).
145. See, e.g., State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1987); People v. Vale, 519 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5-7
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
146. See, e.g., State v. Foster, 510 So. 2d 717, 726-27 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
147. In State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990), the court cited the dissent of Justice Rehnquist
in Ake and found that the insanity defense was constitutionally doubtful and that the defendant would
have to prove insanity. Id. at 918. Clearly it would be impossible for an indigent to prove an insanity
defense without a grant of expert assistance.
148. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 800 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Ariz. 1987); Sommers v. Kentucky, 843 S.W.2d
879, 882-85 (Ky. 1992); State v. Parks, 417 S.E.2d 467, 471 (N.C. 1992); Washington v. State, 836 P.2d
673, 674-77 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
149. Gay v. State, 562 So. 2d 283, 290 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (citing Bailey v. State, 421 So. 2d
1364, 1366-67 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)). In Ake, the defendant's bizarre behavior prompted the court
sua sponte to order a psychiatric exam prior to trial. However, this examination was not performed by
a psychiatrist employed by the defense; it was a court-appointed psychiatrist. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 70-71 (1985). Reliance on a judge as a firsthand observer would seem tenuous in the matter
of psychiatric evaluation.
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The federal courts have also grappled with the threshold showing requirement. For example, in United States v. St. John,"' the defendant was charged
with incest and sought appointment of an expert to evaluate the victim
psychiatrically.'
The request was denied. The appellate court, relying on
Ake, acknowledged the defendant's right of access to the materials needed to
construct an effective defense, including expert witnesses.'52 The court,
however, held that defendants do not have "carte blanche', 5 3 to retain any
expert, but only those experts necessary to "present claims fairly within the
adversary system."M St. John illustrated the Eighth Circuit's view of the
threshold requirement: "We strike this balance by requiring that a defendant
show a reasonable probability that an expert would have aided in her defense,
and that the denial of an expert witness resulted in an unfair trial."' 55
In analyzing whether a defendant has raised an issue of sufficient significance
to warrant appointment of an expert, courts are careful not to authorize "fishing
expeditions."'"
Sometimes Congress5 7 and state legislatures158 impose
statutes limiting such fishing expeditions. The defendant's showing of need must
be "clear and genuine" and constitute a "'close' question."' 59 The defense
must articulate a factual basis demonstrating that a defense psychiatrist is
necessary; the defendant's pleading must show more than that the defendant is
merely contemplating an insanity defense."6

150. 851 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988).
151. Id. at 1097-98.
152. Id. at 1098 (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 77).
153. Id
154. Id. (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 77).
155. Id. (citing Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987)). In terms of assuring that
the defendant will have every opportunity to fairly present a case within the adversary system, any
effort by the courts to merely require "reasonable probability" that the expert is necessary would be
a welcome departure from the sometimes constrictive juridical framework that requires a threshold
showing of "insanity" as a significant factor. Particularly efficacious at ensuring the defendant every
opportunity for expert services both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric is the Little court's declaration that
what is important is "how much help a defense expert could have given." Linle, 835 F.2d at 1243; see
supra part III.A and infra part IV. In St. John, the mental capacity of the victim, not the defendant,
was at issue. 851 F.2d at 1098. For a treatment of mental impairment and the criminal defendant, see
generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 414 (1985).
156. In United States v. Alden, 767 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1984), the court noted that to require the
government to pay for psychiatric services just because a private attorney would do so in the hope of
establishing an insanity defense would be to require the government to subsidize a "fishing expedition."
Id at 318.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1988).
158. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 11.3(a), which permits trial courts to provide the defendant with
experts if the court determines that reasonable grounds for an examination exist. As Arizona courts
have construed this rule, it is not enough that the defendant merely contemplates insanity as a defense;
the evidence must create a reasonable doubt in the court's mind as to the defendant's sanity at the time
of the alleged offense. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 800 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Ariz. 1987).
159. State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 68 (Wash. 1990) (citing Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1211
(10th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted)).
160. Id. at 68; see also Messer v. Kemp 831, F.2d 946, 964-65 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1029 (1988) (finding a need for more than "naked demands").
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State courts have denied requests for nonpsychiatric experts with unfortunate
zeal.16 Federal courts have also been reluctant to grant requests for other
types of experts.1 62 For example, in United States v. Valverde,"6 the defendant was charged with conspiring to escape while in federal custody."6
Valverde had met with an undercover deputy who had "secretly recorded the
conversations," which included statements that Valverde later admitted were in
reference to a scheme to attempt escape. ta Valverde requested expert
testimony in the form of a linguistic expert who would have testified that the
tape recorded statements were not designed to influence law enforcement
officers.1" The trial court denied the request.167
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Although the court noted that case
law required the appointment of an expert if needed for an adequate defense, 16' the burden of establishing this need was on the defendant,169 and
the court concluded that it did not believe that the proposed expert witness
would have assisted the trier of fact. Opinions such as Valverde represent the
ad hoc balancing done by the courts that makes it difficult for an indigent to
secure experts when they might in fact be reasonably helpful.
Trial courts are generally given vast discretion in determining whether a
satisfactory showing of need has been made by the defense in requesting an
expert. It is often within the trial court's discretion to determine whether the
appointment would be needless, wasteful, or extravagant.17 Curiously such
courts articulate the importance of providing expert services for the indigent at
length and concede that the opportunity to prepare a defense is a basic tool, but
then diffuse the importance of experts by holding that an expert need not be
161. See, e.g., Siebert v. State, 562 So. 2d 586, 588-90 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (polling expert), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 963 (1990); Williamson v. State, 812 P.2d 384, 395-96 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (hair
comparison and serology), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1592 (1992).
162. See, e.g., Scott v. Louisiana, 934 F.2d 631,633 (5th Cir. 1991) (denial of ballistics expert); United
States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 376-77 (10th Cir. 1986) (denial of penologist), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
908 (1987); United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 737 (9th Cir.) (denial of travel for investigator),
vacated on other grounds, 474 U.S. 991 (U.S. 1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 783 F.2d 154 (9th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Walborn, 730 F.2d 192, 194 (5th Cir.) (denial of fingerprint expert), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984). Contra Terry v. Rees, 985 F.2d 283, 284-85 (6th Cir. 1992) (error, but
harmless, to not appoint an independent expert pathologist for the defense to determine the cause of
death).
163. 846 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1988).
164. Id. at 514.
165. Id. at 515.
166. Id. at 516.
167. Id
168. Id. (citing United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1983)).
169. Id.; see also United States v. Sailer, 552 F.2d 213, 215-16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959
(1977).
170. Scott v. State, 593 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Ind. 1992). The court noted that a wealthy person could
hire any number of people to aid in the defense, but where the court allocates funds, it is rational for
the court to use discretion. Id. at n.7 (citing Magley v. State, 335 N.E.2d 811, 816 (Ind. 1975)). This
standard inescapably vests the outcome of a defendant's request on the judge's financial bent. At least
one court, however, has noted that the fact that funds are in limited supply is not an appropriate reason
for denying access to experts and without more would be an abuse of discretion. State v. Stow, 620
A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1993).
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provided if, in the71 court's opinion, the expert could not show what the
defendant desires.
In cases where an indigent defendant seeks an expert, and a showing of need
is at issue, courts will not reverse a denial of an expert unless there is a
considerable abuse of discretion. In People v. Smith," the court noted that
funds are available only where expert services are crucial and where financial
inability will prejudice the case. The trial court had refused the request for
expert services based on untimeliness and a determination that the expert
service simply would not assist in the understanding of the issues in the case.'73
The appellate court concluded that, even assuming that funds should have been
provided, the failure to do so was harmless error. 74
C. The Mathews v. Eldridge Test: The Ultimate Social Goal of Acquitting
the Innocent
During the time that the rights of the indigent were being developed, the
Supreme Court noted that "the very premise of our adversarial system is that
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate
objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."' 75 In Ake, the
Court noted that in order to provide "[m]eaningful access to justice, ' the
ultimate goal of the adversary system would be to ensure that both parties are
evenly matched for the trial process."7 When society fosters a system that
convicts only guilty people, confidence in the legal system is preserved in the
interest of the general populace and, of course, in the interest of the individual
acquitted. In Ake, the Court relied on Mathews v. Eldridge'78 and a threeprong balancing test: (1) the "private interest" that would be affected by the
State's action; (2) the "[g]overnment's interest" that an additional due process

171. Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 200 (citing Jones v. State, 524 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Ind. 1988)).
172. 614 N.E.2d 1326, 1330 (Ill. App. Ct.), vacated on other grounds, 620 N.E.2d 417 (Ill. 1993).
173. The defendant sought an expert witness and DNA testing after being accused of aggravated
criminal sexual assault. Id.
174. Id. at 1331. On harmless error and the standard of review, see United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d
1016 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Devlin, 13 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1994).
175. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,568 (1986) (citing Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,862
(1975)).
176. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
177. Id. (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 656-57 (1984). In Cronic, the Court noted that if the quality of the confrontation via the adversarial
process is diminished, the right to effective assistance is diminished. Clearly, experts for the indigent
are crucial to the maintenance of the adversarial system.
178. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews test is a familiar one applied primarily in administrative law.
For a general criticism of the test, see Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72
CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1136-44 (1984). Rubin notes that under Mathews there should be a "separate
theory for defining minimum procedures in administrative adjudications." Id. at 1137. Rubin also
argues that to use Mathews to determine due process requirements in nonadministrative cases would
produce "major dislocations in existing doctrine, since it would be very difficult to derive the
components of criminal or civil trials from that framework." Id He also notes the relative insensitivity
in nonadministrative cases of procedural requirements "to the magnitude of the individual interest at
stake." Id. at 1139.
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safeguard would impact; and (3) the "probable value ... of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards" that are sought, and "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation" of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided.179
Courts have often used this test to resolve administrative law disputes" and
civil commitment cases. 181
In Ake, the Court expanded Mathews to incorporate issues of criminal
defense for the indigent. The Court noted its earlier reference to the "quasicriminal" case of Little v. Streater18 and moved to an application of the first
prong. The Court simply noted that the criminal defendant's private interest in
life or liberty was "uniquely compelling"'' and that the "interest of the
individual in the outcome ... weighs heavily."'" On the second prong, the
Court concluded that the financial interest of the state was "not substantial,"
and noted the "compelling interest of both the State and the individual in
accurate dispositions. ' ' s" The Court focused on the third prong and concluded
that psychiatry could play a "pivotal role" and "dramatically enhance[]" the
"potential accuracy of the jury's determination."'"
Recent cases have also relied on the Mathews balancing test. For example,
in Kordenbrock v. Scroggy,'" the Sixth Circuit noted:
[The defendant's] interest in the accuracy of the criminal proceeding-having the jury
be in a position to understand the mental and psychiatric aspects of the
case-outweighs the cost to the state in furnishing experts. After all, it is the state
which is seeking to put the defendant to death. Compared to that cost, the cost of a
psychiatric expert pales."M

Although Ake and Kordenbrock both employ the Mathews test in the context
of a psychiatrist, the neutral language of the balancing of interests could easily
apply to nonpsychiatric experts who often weigh heavily in the needs of the
defendant."8

179. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
180. See, e.g., Lively v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1987). In Bowen, the court employed the
Eldridge test to review the refusal of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to reconsider a
determination that a claimant was no longer entitled to benefits, Id at 269.
181. See, e.g., Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1992). The Goetz court applied the
Mathews test to a defendant faced with an involuntary civil commitment who had raised an Ake claim.
The court held that the Ake "battle of the experts" rationale did not apply, and thus the State's
financial interest outweighed the defendant's private interest. Id. at 33-37.
182. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (citing Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981)).
183. Id. at 78.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 79.
186. Id at 79, 83.
187. 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990).
188. Id. at 1105.
189. The American Bar Association has noted the importance of providing "investigatory, expert,
and other services necessary to an adequate defense." An explanatory note explains that defense
representation "may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if the defense requires the
assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are available." AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 5-1.4 (2d ed. 1986).
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Some courts have noted Ake's reliance on the Mathews test but impose
additional conditions on the test. For example, in State v. Wainwright,"9 the
Kansas Court of Appeals noted that the balancing test in Ake provides a test
for the grant or denial of experts. Before employing the test, however, the
court added the requirement that "a defendant must first clearly show that the
proposed expert testimony will relate to a material issue raised in the
defense."1 91
IV
THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT
A. Ake Revisited: The Expert as Part of the Defense Team
Since Ake,"9 undoubtedly one of the most disputed questions hinges on
the role of the expert. Ake held that once the necessary showing is made,1 93
"the state must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation,and presentation of the defense."'" The Court did not
expressly reverse the earlier precedent established in Baldi,195 but rather
expanded what was a very limited right based on growing concern over the
protection of the rights of the indigent to an adequate defense and the corollary
expert services.196 The Baldi Court simply concluded that "[p]sychiatrists

190. 856 P.2d 163, 167 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
191. Id at 167. The court also noted that a denial of expert services by a lower court will not be
disturbed on appeal unless prejudice to substantial rights is demonstrated. Id. (citing State v. Owens,
807 P.2d 101 (Kan. 1991)).
192. As noted supra parts H-IIl, the dispute over the role of the expert was brewing long before the
Ake decision. In the oft-quoted case of United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1966), the
court interpreted the fledgling Criminal Justice Act to require the appointment of experts where they
"reasonably appear necessary to assist counsel in their preparation." Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
Other pre-Ake courts focused on the role of experts as one of facilitating effective assistance of counsel.
See, e.g., Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985).
193. See supra part III.B.
194. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (emphasis added).
195. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953); see supra part I. Baldi was a somewhat
ambiguous case. The defendant had been examined by a psychiatrist appointed by the court. The
defendant's request for appointment of a psychiatrist was denied by the state court. The Baldi opinion
does not make it clear whether the indigent defendant had no right to a psychiatric examination or
psychiatric expert, or merely a limited right to be left, as Ake would later declare, to the discretion of
the states in the manner of implementation. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
196. In Baldi, "neutral" psychiatrists examined the defendant before his trial. In Ake, the defendant
had been denied any psychiatric assistance concerning his mental state at the time of the offense. Thus,
neutrality appears to be the Baldi standard which is rejected by the Ake Court. The contention that
there is no constitutional right to a psychiatric examination of defendant's sanity at the time of the
offense is not persuasive. Ake, 470 U.S. at 85. The Ake Court arguably expands a defendant's right
to more than a "neutral" psychiatrist by saying that the Court's disagreement with the state court's
reliance on Baldi is "fundamental," and that the Court has "signaled" an "increased commitment to
assuring meaningful access to the judicial process." Id. The Court noted that the enhanced role of
psychiatry in criminal law and the "altogether different variables" cause Baldi to no longer be limiting.
Id.
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testified. That suffices."" Today, the vestiges of Baldi exist primarily in state
courts, where courts lacking resources may focus on the minimum required by
Ake.198 Some federal courts also readily dispatch complaints made by
defendants after there has been expert testimony.199
In De Freece v. State,' the defendant appealed a murder conviction on
the grounds that the trial court erred in failing to appoint an expert to prepare
an insanity defense °1 After an extensive analysis of Ake and the pivotal role
of psychiatry and the assistance to be provided by psychiatrists, the court
reversed. The reversal was based largely on the fact that since sanity was the
only contested issue, failure to appoint an expert may have contributed to the
verdict.' The court also noted that more than just simply favorable psychiatric testimony is required to satisfy Ake.' Counsel may require other aid such
as in interpretation of records or conclusions more in keeping with the idea of
the expert as a member of the defense team.'
B. Neutral, Partisan, and Independent Experts
While leaving some discretion to the states' in implementing the
holding, the rationale of Ake clearly requires more than a "neutral" psychiatrist.' However, many courts since Ake have imposed grants for psychiatric
assistance that amount to little more than "neutral" assistance.7 Post-Ake
197. 344 U.S. at 568.
198. For example, in People v. Wright, 594 N.E.2d 276 (111. 1992), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1993),
the defendant who was convicted of burglary, attempted murder, murder, and other crimes, had been
hospitalized for 15 years as the result of a "shoe fetish." Two psychiatrists had been appointed by the
court at trial. Id. at 279. Later, when possible mitigating evidence was discovered in a post-conviction
proceeding, the court interpreted Ake to hold that the defendant was entitled to one and only one
psychiatrist. Id. at 286-87. This is characteristic of courts which focus more on minimizing Ake rather
than providing adequate tools for the defense.
199. In Brown v. Doe, 803 F. Supp. 932, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), the court noted that the defendant
complained only after the expert, one of the defendant's own choice and paid for by the state, testified
that the defendant labored under no mental disease or defect which would prevent him from
understanding.
200. 848 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 284 (1993).
201. Defense counsel had sought an expert who "would be a member of the defense team, would
be available for helping preparation of the case, preparation of cross examination, deciding which tests
were needed, range and form, that sort of thing, as well as being present during trial to help the
defendant." Id at 152. The trial court's response was that one expert had already been appointed
(who had gone on record as supporting the State's position) and another was not necessary. Id
202. Id at 160.
203. The court noted that even though adequate cross-examination was conducted this does not
mean that an even more effective job could have been done with an expert's assistance. Id. at 159.
204. Id. at 160-61.
205. Ake, 470 U.S. at 85.
206. Many states have adopted the Arkansas approach, which holds that a defendant's right to an
examination under Ake is adequately protected by an examination at the state hospital which is
uninvolved in criminal prosecutions. See Coulter v. State, 804 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Ark.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 102 (1991). Generally, such psychiatric exams are statutorily provided. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-305 (Michie Supp. 1993).
207. In Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042 (1987),
Louisiana had established a two-member "sanity commission" and only one of the members testified
to the sanity of the defendant at the time of the offense. The court denied the defendant's claim to a
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courts have in fact generally favored appointments from the public sector.2
In United States v. Rinchack,2°9 the Eleventh Circuit held that once the
required showing of need was made, the psychiatrist could be "any other
qualified psychiatrist.,211210 This term included court-appointed and privately

retained psychiatrists.

Neutral or impartial experts have posed a number of problems since the Ake
decision. In Granviel v. Lynaugh,2 12 the defendant requested the appointment
of a psychiatrist and requested that the psychiatrist be unavailable to the
prosecution or the court. Since state law required disclosure to all parties of
any appointed psychiatrist's report, the request was denied.213
The Granviel court appointed a disinterested expert whose report would be
available to the prosecution and defense.2 4 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held
that Granviel's Ake rights were not violated. According to the court, the sole
purpose of the expert was to enable him to form an opinion on the defendant's
mental capacity.215

The "disinterested qualified expert" was not to be a

private consultant for either party but to serve the court.216 The court also
denied the defendant's claims that his fifth amendment right was violated by

violation of Ake rights based on the ground that no independent psychiatrist was requested, although
it could have been. Id at 1168-69. This dubious rationale seems to violate the spirit of the Ake holding.
208. In Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 908 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1990),
the court emphasized that appointment of a psychiatrist from the public sector is not per se
unreasonable, and due process does not require a private psychiatrist. Id. at 1311-12.
209. 820 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1987). Prior to trial, the defendant claimed he was incompetent to
stand trial due to an earlier accident. Id. at 1561. Thirty minutes prior to the scheduled competency
hearing, Rinchack sought appointment of a psychiatrist at government expense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e). This request was denied. Id at 1562. Rinchack was found competent and was later
convicted at trial. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's discretionary refusal to
appoint Rinchack an expert on two grounds: (1) the request was not timely and (2) the services were
not necessary to an adequate defense. Id at 1563-64.
210. Id. at 1565.
211. Id. (citing United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The court noted that
the issue does not revolve around what technical provision the expert was appointed under but, rather,
whether the necessary assistance was received. Id.
212. 881 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990).
213. Id. at 191.
214. Id. at 190-91. Before the trial began, the state amended § 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, which provided that disinterested, qualified experts such as court-appointed psychiatrists
were prohibited from testifying about statements made by the defendant. After the amendment, a copy
of the "disinterested" psychiatrist's report had to be furnished to the court and to opposing counsel.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 46.02 § 3(d) (West 1992).
215. Granviel, 881 F.2d at 191-92. The court apparently justified its findings on the purpose of the
expert on the grounds that the "ability [of the defendant] to uncover the truth concerning his sanity is
not prejudiced by the appointment of a court-ordered psychiatrist." Id.; see also Steven A. Saltzburg,
Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L. REv. 597 (1980). More in keeping
with Ake's attempt to provide the defendant with an "adequate defense" in every respect would be to
restrict the findings of the defense psychiatrist to avoid creation of incriminating evidence.
216. Granviel, 881 F.2d at 191. Justices Marshall and Brennan would have granted certiorari in
Granviel on the question of whether an indigent criminal defendant's constitutional right to psychiatric
assistance in preparing an insanity defense is satisfied by court appointment of a psychiatrist whose
examination report is available to both the defense and prosecution. Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963
(1990) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari). Nevertheless,
the precise scope of Ake's requirement of psychiatric assistance remains an open issue.
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disclosure of the report"' and that his sixth amendment right was violated
because no independent expert was appointed.2 18
In State v. Richards,2 9 the defendant appealed his conviction of first-degree
murder in part because he was denied an independent psychiatrist. A state
psychiatrist was used by the prosecution, and this expert was to make his
services and opinions available to the defendant. The trial court rejected the
defendant's request and held that no claim was made that the psychiatrist was
incompetent but only that the expert was "neutral."'
The Supreme Court
of Minnesota affirmed the denial, noting that a defendant cannot complain that
he was denied access to a psychiatrist because he chose not to take advantage
of the available assistance.
Courts have followed the Granviel rationale22 and seem to focus more on
Ake's limitation on services for the indigent, noting that the defendant's right
does not include the "right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to
receive funds to hire his own.''222 If not totally incorrect, these cases certainly
misread the emphatic message of Ake. The emphasis in Ake was on providing
an expert who would "assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the
defense.",2' Although some courts have claimed that due process implications
are satisfied by appointment of a neutral or independent psychiatrist 4 (or
arguably another type of expert), a better reading of Ake would hold that there
is no such thing as a neutral expert for the defense.'
Part of the confusion in lower courts revolves around a characterization of
the expert's role (whether psychiatric or nonpsychiatric) as an assistant to
defense counsel in preparation and presentation of the defense.2 2 Thus,
although some lower courts have held that proper assistance for the defense
under Ake is satisfied even when the psychiatric report is revealed to the court

217. Granviel, 881 F.2d at 190. Relying on Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987), the court
held the privilege was waived by raising sanity issues. Id.
218. Granviel, 881 F.2d at 190 (holding that the defendant's 6th amendment rights had not yet
attached).
219. 495 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1992).
220. Id at 198. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02 provides that the court may submit a defendant asserting
a mental illness defense to an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist.
221. See, e.g., Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 n.22 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding no constitutional right
to select a psychiatrist of personal liking, citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,83 (1985)), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1110 (1991).
222. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 928-34 (11th Cir. 1992).
225. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1990) (reading Ake to reject the idea of a
"neutral" court-appointed psychiatrist).
226. See, e.g., Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
FlippingCoins in the Courtroom,62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974); Abraham S. Goldstein & Edith W. Fine,
The IndigentAccused, The Psychiatrist,and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061 (1962); Ralph
Reisner & Herbert Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the ProposedFederalCriminal
Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1974).
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and to the prosecution,'m a better reading of Ake is that found in United
States v. Sloan.22
In Sloan, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's denial of the
defendant's request for an expert psychiatrist. The court relied on Ake229 and
the Criminal Justice Act,' which together mandate the appointment of an
expert as a "clear duty upon request""2 when mental condition is a significant
factor at trial. Writing for the court, Judge Moore concluded that the clear duty
to appoint an expert
cannot be satisfied with the appointment of an expert who ultimately testifies contrary
to the defense on the issue of competence. The essential benefit of having an expert
in the first place is denied the defendant when the services of the doctor must be
shared with the prosecution. 2-

Considerable dispute rages over the defendant's right to an independent
expert who could aid in the preparation and presentation of the defense.21
Although the liberal reading of Ake in Sloan is arguably the best,234 many
courts construe the right to an expert to aid the defense much more narrowly.235 Many lower courts 6 tend to focus on Ake's language refusing to
227. See, e.g., Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185 (5th Cit. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990).
228. 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1985). In Sloan, the defendant kidnapped a woman in Oklahoma City
and forced her to accompany him to Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The defense requested that a psychiatrist
be appointed and cited the defendant's history of psychiatric treatment. Id. at 927. The government
also filed a motion for psychiatric examination, which was granted. Defendant's renewed request for
a psychiatric exam was denied for lack of justification. The court held that any bias could be corrected
through cross-examination. Id. After the defendant's third request for assistance was denied, the
defendant was convicted and sentenced to 75 years in prison. Id.
229. Judge Moore noted that Ake was decided after Sloan was tried. Nevertheless, the court's ruling
relied heavily on the rationale of Ake. Id. at 928.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1988); see also infra part V.A.1.
231. Sloan, 776 F.2d at 929.
232. Itd
233. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
234. Other cases have relied on Sloan in an effort not to "place a temporal limit on relevant proof
of mental illness." United States v. Austin, 933 F.2d 833, 842 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
1859 (1993). In Austin, the defendant was charged with resisting three correctional officers at
Leavenworth Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas. Id. at 834. The trial court denied the request for
appointment of a psychiatrist for the defense on the grounds that the defendant, a paranoid
schizophrenic who became entangled with a guard when his cell door opened, was not motivated in the
incident by mental illness. Id. at 835. The defendant was given an additional 18 months on his sentence.
Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that under Ake, the request should have been granted and that
the defendant was prejudiced when medical reports dealing with his prior state hospitalizations were
excluded from evidence. Id. at 841-42. Austin also notes the breakdown that occurs any time an expert
ultimately testifies contrary to the defense. Id. at 841 (citing Sloan, 776 F.2d at 929).
235. The term "defense consultant" within the context of Ake rights was coined by Justice Rehnquist
in his dissent in Ake. He said that "the entitlement is to an independent psychiatric evaluation, not a
defense consultant." Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
236. See, e.g., Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 n.22 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110
(1991). In Silagy, the Seventh Circuit noted that indigent defendants have no constitutional right to
select a psychiatrist of their personal liking or to an expert that would testify exclusively in their favor.
In Henderson v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 1309 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 621 (1992), the
defendant implicated himself in two murders and was sentenced to death. Id. at 1311. The court
denied the defendant's claim that he had received ineffective assistance simply because the testimony
had not been sufficiently favorable. Id. at 1316. In Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909, 922 (1986), the defendant was convicted by a state court of murder,
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recognize 2 that
a defendant has a right to an expert of the defendant's own
7
choosing. 3

Courts are particularly inclined to deny the appointment of an independent
expert when the request is not timely.21 8 In State v. Harris, the defendant
sought appointment of an independent handwriting expert immediately before
trial. 3 9 The court did not deny that the expert could have provided valuable
assistance to the defendant but upheld the denial on the grounds that the
defendant knew three months before trial that the state was seeking an expert,
and neither the state nor the court ever led the defendant to believe the expert
would not testify. In United States v. Williams,' the court determined that
any right to appointment of an independent psychiatric expert was waived when
counsel at a preliminary hearing denied that the defendant would rely on a
defense of insanity.24
C. The Role of the Expert: A Defense Advocate
The confusion and inconsistency in the lower federal and state courts 242
appears to be unwarranted. The language in Ake defines the expert's role
unequivocally as one of assistance in "evaluation, preparation, and presentation
of the defense., 243 As one post-Ake court noted:
The right to psychiatric assistance does not mean the right to place the report of a
"neutral" psychiatrist before the court; rather it means the right to use the services of
a psychiatrist in whatever capacity defense counsel deems appropriate-includingto

kidnapping, armed robbery, and forcible sexual battery and was sentenced to death. The defendant had
been examined by mental health experts including four psychiatrists who were either court-appointed
or recruited by the defense. The defendant's request for a neuropsychologist who would testify on
organic brain damage was denied. Id. at 933. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that
Ake provided "no solace" and that under Ake the defendant was only entitled to an independent expert
and not to favorable testimony. Id. at 934-35.
237. After providing that "the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
psychiatrist," the Court qualified this statement by writing "not to say, of course, that the indigent
,defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds
to hire his own." Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. Intrinsically, this would put the defendant at more of a
disadvantage than a monied counterpart.
238. See State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 740 (1994).
239. 839 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1368 (1993). The defendant, alleging failure
to provide the expert violated due process, equal protection, and right to effective assistance of counsel,
relied on the protections provided in Ake.
240. 998 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 940 (1994).
241. Id. at 263. Curiously the court noted that even if the request was not waived, there would have
been no denial of due process because the court concluded that sanity would not have been a significant
factor at trial. Id. at 264.
242. Part of the post-Ake confusion over the role of the expert is related to varied interpretations
of the Ake standard, particularly at the state court level. Some courts interpret Ake to hold that a
psychiatrist must be appointed at state expense any time the "mental condition of the defendant is likely
to be an issue in the case." State v. Rhoades, 822 P.2d 960, 967 (Idaho 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
962 (1993). This application goes beyond the Ake mandate of "insanity" as a "significant factor."
Other state courts, however, more strenuously resist granting requests for state paid experts and focus
on the notion that a "defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal
proceeding." Mills v. State, 603 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla.1992) (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 82).
243. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
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decide, with the psychiatrist's assistance, not to present to the court particular claims
of mental impairment.2'

As a result, a fair reading of Ake entitles defense counsel to either use or not
use the expert as he deems appropriate in a number of capacities. The defense
counsel's ability to use the psychiatrist (or arguably some other expert) should
extend to excluding the expert's testimony if such a course of action would aid
in the defense.245 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have not survived
court challenge on the grounds that counsel excluded expert testimony 246 or
that an independent psychiatrist appointed for the defense was not given every
record of the defendant's health.24 7

A difficult task for post-Ake courts has been to highlight the importance of
a psychiatrist for the indigent defendant faithfully while still balancing the
constraints imposed by Ake. 2 8 In Harris v. Vasquez,249 the court provided
a model of successful balancing. Harris was charged with two counts of murder,
convicted, and sentenced to death. At the guilt phase of the trial, "[t]he State
provided Harris with access to any competent psychiatrist of his choice."'
The Ninth Circuit held that the state "went beyond the requirements of Ake"
by allowing the defendant access to a psychiatrist that was not limited "in any
way.'"" The state even provided funds to Harris so that he could hire his
own psychiatrist. On appeal, Harris alleged that his Ake right to a competent
exam and a competent state-funded psychiatrist had been denied. The Ninth
244. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
245. Id. The court notes that a disservice may be done to the defendant if the defense counsel is
made an involuntary witness after consultation with the defense psychiatrist. Disclosures made to both
the attorney and the attorney's expert should be unavailable. The attorney "must be free to make an
informed judgment with respect to the best course for the defense." Id. at 1160.
246. Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1363 (1993) (holding
that the failure to present psychiatrists to rebut damaging testimony was competent assistance because
it kept the door closed to differing opinions and contributed to the defense effort). State courts have
also grappled with ineffective assistance of counsel claims as they define the role of the expert. See, e.g.,
Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991). In Engberg, Chief Justice Urbigkit in a separate opinion
cited Ake and then commented that the presentation of hypnosis evidence by an expert may have sixth
amendment implications. Id. at 149 (Urbigkit, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1301 (1993).
248. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 791 P.2d 244, 249-50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). Unfortunately, although
Ake acknowledged the "extraordinarily enhanced role of psychiatry in criminal law today," Ake, 470
U.S. 68, 85 (1985), many courts still seem to loosely perform this role themselves. In Garcia, the court
said that the defendant's behavior had several probable causes including anger, depression, and
withdrawal from drugs. Garcia, 791 P.2d at 250. As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's denial of a psychiatric expert. Id. Another example of the conclusory psychological judgments
of courts is found in United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 940
(1994). In Williams, the court reasoned that since the defendant had handled a custody dispute
involving his son pro se, there was no reason to believe that sanity would be a factor in the kidnapping
charge which warranted appointment of a psychiatric expert under either the CJA or the Insanity
Defense Reform Act. Id. at 266, 267 (citing United States v. Alden, 767 F.2d 314, 315 (7th Cir. 1984)).
249. 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1275 (1992). The defendant, along with
his brother, stole an automobile for use as a bank robbery getaway car. At point blank range, Harris
shot the two teenage boys who had been eating hamburgers in the car. Id. The trial court would
eventually sentence Harris to death. IdL at 1500.
250. Id. at 1516.
251. Id.
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Circuit affirmed the state trial court's denial of the request for review of the
competence of Harris's psychiatric assistance." z The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the critical nature of Ake rights,253 but, as to the defendant's elevenyear-old case, it held that "such battles of psychiatric opinions during successive
collateral challenges to a death sentence would place federal courts in a psycho
legal quagmire. '
For an expert to function effectively as a member of the defense team,
conditions should not be placed on the expert's role or services. In State v.

White,25' the court conditioned the appointment of experts on the preparation
of written reports regarding the expert's evaluations. The reports, which were
to be provided to the prosecution, were to contain all information related to the
expert evaluations, including but not limited to raw scores, observations,
conclusions, and any other pertinent information. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the trial court exceeded its authority by so conditioning the
reports 56

D. The Role of the Expert: An Aid to Judge, Jury, Counsel, and Defendant
The assistance of psychiatrists and other experts in a criminal case is of
critical importance. 7 The Ake decision quantified the importance of the
expert as a constitutional right,"8 but also broadened the scope of the expert's
role. 9 This is particularly but not exclusively true of psychiatric experts.'261
Ake's descriptions of the role of a psychiatrist in relation to the trier of fact,

252. Id. at 1528-29.
253. Id. at 1518-21. The court confronted the retroactivity implications with regard to an Ake claim
in Harris's case. Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), exceptions can be made for "watershed
rules of criminal procedure," which implicate fundamental fairness. Harris,949 F.2d at 1519. After a
lengthy analysis of Teague, the court concluded that Harris made no such claim, but rather offered
"only declarations of experts who, eleven years after trial" would testify to Harris's receipt of
incompetent assistance. Id. at 1521. Again, the court was particularly concerned that Ake violations
would be distinguished from psychiatric malpractice questions.
254. Harris,949 F.2d at 1518. The Court rejected Harris's proposal of a new constitutional rule that
would provide "[p]sychiatric medical malpractice review." Il
255. 419 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. 1992).
256. A North Carolina statute provides that results or reports of a mental exam or test are not
discoverable by the state if the defendant intends neither to introduce the reports or the results thereof
into evidence at trial nor to call the witness who prepared the items to testify related to matters of the
exam. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-905(b) (1988).
257. People v. Lanari, 811 P.2d 399,402 (Colo. App. 1989) (dissenting opinion) ("An expert witness'
analysis of evidence is often as critical to a case as the evidence itself."), affd in part, rev'd in part,827
P.2d 495 (Colo. 1992).
258. "[T]he assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his
defense." Id. at 402 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985)).
259. One state court noted that Ake discussed the inexact nature of psychiatry and even argued that
Ake could be read in part to entitle the prosecution to a compulsory psychiatric exam by its own expert
to rebut the defendant's defense theories. State v. Hess, 828 P.2d 382 (Mont. 1992).
260. See supra part II.C, III.A.
261. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80 ("In this role, psychiatrists gather facts... that they will share with the
judge or jury; they analyze the information ... and . . . draw plausible conclusions about the
defendant's mental condition, and.., any disorder... ; and they offer opinions about ... behavior at
the time in question."); id. ("[P]sychiatrists can translate a medical diagnosis into language that will
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counsel, 2 prosecution, 2' and the court could, as noted, apply equally to
nonpsychiatric experts.26' Since Ake, courts have grappled with trying
uniformly to determine the situations in which experts should be appointed.'
This confusion over the meaning and reach of Ake has constricted access for the
indigent as a class to both psychiatric experts and nonpsychiatric experts.2
Without the benefit of the Criminal Justice Act, state courts have had
particular difficulty integrating the Ake standard with the broader view that the
role of the expert is increasingly important. In Scott v. Indiana, 7 the Indiana
Supreme Court noted that "in attempting to decide what is necessary, a trial
court should determine whether the proposed services would bear on an issue
which is generally regarded to be within the common experience of the average
person, or on one for which expert opinion would be necessary."2' The Scott
court noted the Ake mandate of providing the indigent with the tools to present
a claim fairly within the adversary system, but simply affirmed the denial on the
grounds that "[t]he jury could decide without an expert's testimony whether
Scott was too intoxicated ....269 Scott reflects the view of most state courts

assist the trier of fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form that has meaning."); id.at 82 ("With such
assistance, the defendant is fairly able to present at least enough information to the jury, in a
meaningful manner, as to permit it to make a sensible determination.").
262. Id. at 83 ("assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense"). One of the most
important aids is to "assist in preparing the cross examination" of state witnesses. Id. at 82. See infra
part III.E. Experts can also identify "issues relevant to the defense... [in order to] determine whether
the insanity defense is viable." Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
263. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80 ("They know the probative questions to ask of the opposing party's
psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers.").
264. E.g., Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988)
(holding that the hypnosis expert could have presented the limitations of hypnosis and explained
memory theory to the better understanding of the court and jury).
265. See, e.g., People v. Knuckles, 589 N.E.2d 1080, 1082-83 (Ill. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 1994 WL
46880 (Ill. Feb. 17, 1994). After a lengthy recitation of the salient points of Ake, the court observed
that the indigent defendant needed the expert to assess the wisdom of asserting an insanity defense and
to help counsel intelligently scrutinize adverse testimony. Id. at 1083.
266. There are comparatively few instances of grants for nonpsychiatric assistance. Most courts
reason that Ake "cannot be broadly interpreted to require a state to provide experts of any category
of a defendant's own choosing or to assist him in whatever defenses he chooses." Siebert v. State, 562
So. 2d 586, 590 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), affd sub nona, Ex parte Siebert, 562 So.2d 600 (Ala.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 963 (1990) (quoting Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 77, 82 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985)). The polling expert in Siebert was denied. Id.at 588-90; see also United
States v. Valverde, 846 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying request for a linguistic expert).
267. 593 N.E.2d 198 (Ind. 1992). The defendant was convicted of numerous charges in connection
with forced sexual conduct of a young girl and sentenced to 110 years. Id. at 199. He was denied an
expert on the issue of intent after arguing that he was so intoxicated he could not form the requisite
intent. Physicians and psychiatrists were appointed to assist the defendant. Id.
268. Id. at 200 (citation omitted).
269. Id. at 202. The court's analysis attempted to balance the purpose of the request, the timeliness
of the request, the ability of counsel to perform the purpose for which the expert is requested and other
factors. Id. at 199-202. The court's ultimate decision to affirm, however, was based largely on the fact
that the government did not intend to have an expert analogous to the one requested by the defendant,
and as a result the defendant's request was ipso facto unnecessary. Id. at 202.
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arguably exploration would be
that experts have no exploratory role, though
270
one of the expert's most useful functions.
The courts that grant indigent defendants funding for an expert to assuage
the inequities faced by the indigent exhibit a better reading of Ake than the
courts that focus on a rigid "significant factor at trial" test. 71 Courts should
err on the side of delivering the expert as a "basic tool" to a defense, which a
defendant may not be able to prove without the assistance of an expert in the
first place.2' Both federal and state courts have had difficulty capturing the
importance of the tripartite role of the "independent" expert to the defendant,
the jury, and counsel.2 73 Many state courts imply that the expert requested
may have provided useful defense assistance and then proceed to deny the
request for services. For example, in Kansas v. Wainwright,274 the defendant
sought, prior to trial, the use of an expert on bloodhound evidence. The court
noted that "[b]loodhound evidence is indeed unique and novel, and clearly, a
bloodhound expert might well have helped" the defendant.275 The defendant,
however, did not show that the expert's services were necessary in order to
prepare for trial.276
In State v. Stow, 21 the defendant sought an expert in eyewitness identification after being accused of kidnapping. The trial court held that the request for
an expert was not reasonable because the relevance and the admissibility of
expert testimony were in question, and the request was not for a psychologist
who had dealt with the victim and could testify that the victim had memory
problems. The court also noted that the psychologist would invade the province
270. The Scott court noted that an expert need not be appointed when the purpose of the expert
appears to be exploratory only, when the services will go toward an ancillary question rather than a
substantial one, or where the attorney could provide the services. Id.; see also Hough v. State, 560
N.E.2d 511 (Ind. 1990).
271. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 68 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (applying "significant factor
at trial" standard).
272. Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cit. 1992), is a good example of a court reading Ake to
warrant the appointment of an expert because it will simply help the defense to present its case and
help the jury to understand. In a Kansas state trial court, the defendant was convicted of aiding and
abetting a kidnapping and felony murder. Id. at 309-10. The trial court denied the grant of an expert
to explain the effects of battered woman's syndrome. Id. at 310-11. On appeal the Tenth Circuit
affirmed a district court's grant of habeas corpus relief. The defendant was granted a new trial with
the assistance of an expert in the preparation and preservation of her defense. Id at 314. The court
held that the defendant should not be denied funds to present relevant information bearing on the
crime of which she was convicted. Id.
273. First, the expert can aid a defendant in determining whether a defense based on mental
condition is warranted. Second, the expert can coherently present to the jury his or her observations
of the defendant. Third, the expert can assist in preparing cross-examination of government experts.
See United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 637 (7th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982
(1989).
274. 856 P.2d 163 (Kan. App. 1993).
275. Id. at 167. This case is also illustrative of the consistency with which courts deny requests for
services which, in the view of the court, are not timely made, a constraint which does not apply to a
paying defendant. Here the decision not to grant the request for services was made, in part, because
the defense did not request the expert until several days before trial. Id.
276. Id.
277. 620 A.2d 1023 (N.H. 1993).
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of the jury278 and that state funds were in short supply.279 Unfortunately,
many such decisions reflect a willingness by the court to infringe on the
important need of the defense to use an expert in whatever way the defense
chooses.

In Mendoza v. Leapley,2 the defendant sought appointment of a psychologist to prepare a defense to the charge of first-degree rape. The lower court
denied the request, and defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
held that the defendant was convicted based on the state's physical evidence and
the victim's testimony. The court reasoned that since the State did not present
psychological evidence, the defendant did not require an expert to respond to
the evidence presented. 21 The Mendoza court's rationale, therefore, arguably
deprived the defendant of a more complete defense.
E. The Expert and Cross-Examination
The fact that state and lower federal courts have seemingly missed the Ake
court's reference to the value of experts in the preparation of cross-examination
is an example of the difficulty these courts have had in correctly reading
Ake.'
Although Ake expressly notes the importance of an expert in
preparing cross-examination, far too many courts have focused instead on the
defense counsel's cross-examination of the prosecution's expert witness as a
Few courts
substitute for the defense receiving the use of its own expert.'
seem to read Ake generously in the area of providing psychiatric experts to help
prepare for cross-examination. 81
Reliance on cross-examination also produces the courts' denial of experts in
many nonpsychiatric cases.'
In Jackson v. Yist, 2 the trial court's denial
278. Federal courts also routinely deny appointment of experts where the subject matter is within
the ken of the average juror. See United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding denial
of expert witness on hazards of eyewitness identification), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1323 (1993).
279. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the denial of services but noted that lack of
funds standing alone was an insufficient grounds for denial. Stow, 620 A.2d at 1027.
280. 5 F.3d 341 (8th Cit. 1993).
281. lI. at 342. The court reasoned that an expert need only be provided "if the defendant shows
'a reasonable probability that an expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of expert assistance
would result in an unfair trial."' Id (quoting Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d at 1244).
282. The Ake Court noted that the widespread reliance on psychiatry by both the state and those
who could afford a psychiatric expert "leads to the inexorable conclusion that" a psychiatrist was crucial
in preparing the cross-examination of the state's psychiatric witness. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 82.
283. See, e.g., Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1986). In Magwood the state presented
six experts. The defendant's request for an independent psychiatrist was denied. Id. at 1443.
Preparation of cross-examination in such situations is obviously difficult. See also Kansas v. Wainwright,
856 P.2d 163 (Kan. App. 1993) (holding that all of the defense questions could be answered through
cross-examination).
284. One of the cases that provides a psychiatrist for the preparation of cross-examination based on
the mandate of Ake is United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1986). Even though four treating
or court-appointed psychiatrists testified, the Tenth Circuit nonetheless held that the defendant was
entitled to a psychiatrist to aid in the preparation of cross-examination. Id. at 833-34.
285. See, e.g., Banks v. State, 810 P.2d 1286 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 883
(1992). The defendant alleged that a fingerprint expert could have discredited a prosecution witness.
The court affirmed a denial of the request for the fingerprint expert on the grounds that a thorough
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of an eyewitness identification expert was affirmed because the court of appeals
held that cross-examination was sufficient "to alert jurors to specific conditions
that render a particular eyewitness identification unreliable."'
In Williamson
v. State,' the court argued that scientific evidence is "not vulnerable to
inaccurate resolution" and "does not ordinarily call for a defense expert. ' '
In Williamson, defense counsel cross-examined the state witnesses, and the court
held that due process was not violated when a request for an expert was
denied.2'
Moore v. Kemp 291 illustrates some of the problems that attorneys representing indigents face in securing experts. In Moore, the defendant alleged that
without appointed experts who could serve as defense consultants, proper crossexamination of the state's microanalyst and serologist as to the tests they
performed could not be conducted.29 The court admitted that "defense
counsel may be unfamiliar with the specific scientific theories implicated in a
case" and obligated the defense counsel to "inform" himself or herself about
those scientific theories.293 Courts often require an explanation of considerable depth2 ' as to how the requested expert will help before the request is
granted. However, the very purpose for which the expert may be needed by
defense counsel is to "inform" counsel so that they can explain to the court why
the expert is necessary to the particular defense contemplated. In this manner,
the expert may aid counsel in rebutting the scientific theories in a case such as
Kemp.

cross-examination had been conducted. Id. at 1293.
286. 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990).
287. Id. at 886 (citing United States v. Cristophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also
United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986).
288. 812 P.2d 384 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1529 (1992).
289. Id. at 396 (citing Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019
(1986)).
290. 812 P.2d at 396.
291. 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
292. Id. at 709.
293. Id. at 712; see also United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming trial
court's denial of a government-funded investigator, in part because "no showing was made that defense
counsel had ferreted out information through his own effort which was likely to lead to the discovery
of relevant evidence").
294. State courts also impose arguably heavy investigative duties on counsel who are requesting
experts. See, e.g., State v. Biegenwald, 594 A.2d 172 (NJ. 1991). There, the request for a psychiatric
expert in a subsequent proceeding was denied because counsel did not adequately attempt to uncover
new evidence with regard to the defendant's condition at the time the crime was committed. Id. at 204
(Handler, J., concurring). A distinction should be made between imposing investigative duties on
counsel and merely making a reasonable showing of need.
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V
LEGISLATION PROVIDING EXPERT SERVICES FOR THE POOR

A. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964
1. Why the Statute was Enacted. Legislation is one way of redressing what
has been called "the imbalance in the criminal process when the resources of
'
the United States Government are pitted against an indigent defendant."295
In response to the need to provide those financially disadvantaged with
attorneys and the expert services crucial to an adequate defense, Congress
enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (the "CJA").29 The CJA provides
compensation to court-appointed counsel, reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses, and payment for other defense services for persons charged with
federal crimes (other than petty
offenses) who are "financially unable to obtain
297
...adequate representation."
The services of both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts were clearly
intended to be part of the basic defense tools provided by the CJA. With
reference to the CJA, former President John E Kennedy wrote:
In the typical criminal case the resources of government are pitted against those of the
individual. To guarantee a fair trial under such circumstances requires that each
accused person have ample opportunity to gather evidence and to prepare and present
his cause. Whenever the lack of money prevents a defendant from securing an
experienced
lawyer, trained investigator or technical expert, an unjust conviction may
29
follow. 8

The importance of experts was so great even twenty years before the Ake
decision 299 that the CJA provided for experts even when defendants had
retained counsel but were too poor to pay for the accompanying expert

295. United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2nd Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Austin, 933
F.2d 833, 841 (10th Cir. 1991) ("when a state brings its judicial power to bear ... it must take steps to
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense" (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. at 76)).
296. Now the Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1988. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
The CJA was originally enacted as the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A).
297. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). The CJA is significant for, among other reasons, it expands the
eligibility for benefits. In order to qualify for representation and defense (expert) services, the
defendant need not be completely destitute. See S. REP. No. 346, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess. 13 (1963)
(report of the Judiciary Conference of the United States); H.R. DOC. No. 62, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1965).
298. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to Hon. John W. McCormick, Speaker of the House
of Representatives (March 8, 1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2993.
299. See Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Senator Hruska's
testimony in support of the 1964 proposed legislation: "An adequate representation commonly entails
more than the mere presence of a lawyer in court. To prepare his defense, [a defendant] may need
investigative, expert, or other services." 110 CONG. REC. 18521 (1964)).
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services.'
Persons who are eligible for representation under the CJA but
who elect to proceed pro se may, upon request, receive court authorization to
obtain investigative, expert, and other services under subsection (e) of the
CJA. 0 1 Benefits under the CJA are administered under "Criminal Justice Act
Plans" promulgated by each United States district court. Procedures are
prescribed primarily by the Defender Services Division of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts with and under the direction of the Judicial
Conference Committee on Defender Services."° Administration of the CJA
is driven by the Guidelines for the Administration of the Criminal Justice Act
("CJA Guidelines"), which have been enacted with the approval of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. 3°3 This section will examine the CJA and
its subsequent interpretation by the courts, and will also consider the CJA in
relation to cases such as Ake, noting the heavy reliance by the lower courts on
both the CJA and the Ake standard in distributing expert services.
2. The Statute. The CJA provides in part: "Counsel for a person who is
financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for
adequate representation may request them in an ex parte application. Upon
finding . . . that the services are necessary ... the court . .. shall authorize
counsel to obtain the services. ''304 The CJA specifies that expert services shall
be requested in an ex parte proceeding, at which defense counsel must make a
preliminary showing of need. In United States v. Goodwin, 5 the trial court
refused to hold an ex parte proceeding before denying the request for expert
services. The trial court denied the request on the ground that the defense
alleged no facts of which the defendant was not aware and which would require
investigation. Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction on
appeal, 3" it indicated that, if defense counsel asserts that expert services are
necessary for an adequate defense, the district courts should not rule on the
application for expert services without first conducting an ex parte proceeding.3° Courts have also held that conducting a pretrial hearing on defendant's

300. The House Report stated:
As the bill passed the Senate, services other than counsel-such as fingerprint, psychiatric,
ballistic, investigator, etc.- would be available to all defendants who could not afford them,
regardless of whether they were represented by appointed or by retained counsel. The
language of the House version would seem to make such services available only to defendants
represented by appointed counsel, despite the fact that in the House debate it was made clear
this restriction was not intended. The conferees have therefore made the House and Senate
intention explicit.
H.R. REP. NO. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1964).
301. See 7 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, Appointment of Counsel in Criminal

Cases § 3.01B (1990 as amended) [hereinafter CJA GUIDELINES].
302. This committee was formerly called the Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice Act.
303. See CJA GUIDELINES, supra note 301.
304. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added).
305. 770 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1084 (1986).
306. Id. at 635.
307. Id at 634.
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motion for expert services with government counsel present, rather than ex
parte, is error.3 8
In Ake, the Court cited the CJA and noted that "Congress has provided that
indigent defendants shall receive the assistance of all experts necessary for an
adequate defense."3
The Ake Court acknowledged that the CJA provides
for both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts. Lower federal courts have
unfortunately varied widely in their application of the CJA both before and
after Ake. The CJA is a mechanism for funding and does not necessarily
provide plenary power for the federal courts when considering appointment of
experts. In Jackson v. Vasquez,31 the indigent prisoner filed a request for an
order compelling the warden to transport him to a hospital for a brain scan and
psychological analysis. The court held that the defendant is merely entitled to
funds to allow the "defendant's attorneys to obtain investigative, expert or other
services on behalf of the defendant" and "does not empower the district court
'
to compel action from a state official."311
a. Psychiatric experts under the CJA. Before Ake, lower courts were
resistant to requests for psychiatric experts under the CjA. 3 12 In United States
v. Alden,313 the defendant indicated an intention to raise an insanity defense.
The trial court refused to appoint a psychiatrist under the CJA. On appeal, the
314
Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the only conceivable defense
was that of insanity and that since this defense was not viable, the expert would
not be required. 315 The fact that a reasonable private attorney might have
hired the expert was not sufficient.31 6
Ake, however, recognizes that the state has relied on psychiatrists as
examiners, consultants, and witnesses, as have defendants who can afford to pay
for experts. Nevertheless, leveling the playing field for the indigent defendant
has been difficult for most post-Ake courts. A majority of courts have had
difficulty in recognizing the importance of the independent expert and applying

308. See, e.g., United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
908 (1987).
309. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79-80 (1985).
310. 1 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1993).
311. Id. at 888 (emphasis in original). The court also noted that it would be appropriate to disburse
the funds in ex pane proceedings so that the defense strategy would not be compromised by premature
revelation to the prosecution.
312. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 587 F. Supp. 80, 80-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
313. 767 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1984).
314. Id. at 318. The defendant was caught lying in the snow by the fence of the United States
Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois as he tried to escape. Id. at 316. The defendant claimed that he was
God. Id. at 317.
315. Id. at 317-20.
316. Id. at 318-19. The court said that the defendant must have a plausible defense and that it would
not "subsidize" mere "fishing expeditions." Id. at 319. The disturbing part of the decision is that the
court also recognized that subsection (e) relief should not be refused when the underlying facts
reasonably suggest that further exploration may be beneficial to the defendant. Id. Without an expert,
however, this may be impossible to determine.
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the Ake standard to the language in the CJA that calls for an expert's
assistance.
Post-Ake opinions generally deny requests for psychiatric experts under the
CJA.3 17 In United States v. Fazzini,318 the court noted the important rights
guaranteed by Ake and the CJA. While holding that the indigent defendant has
a right to present any evidence relevant to a viable defense, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of an expert.319 Decisions such as Fazzini
seem to recognize the importance of creating a more level playing field for the
indigent through the grant of psychiatric experts, but have difficulty with the
idea that the experts need to be independent. 320 Many post-Ake courts still
rely on expertise coming from sources other than experts appointed for the
defendant, such as the findings made by federal medical facilities 321 or by
neutral prosecution experts.322 But what seems to be clearly contemplated by
the CJA and reinforced by Ake is that the expert is to assist in the preparation
and presentation of the defense.32

The decision to grant or deny a motion for services under the CJA is
committed to the discretion of the trial court and will only be overturned where
there is an abuse of that discretion.324 The vast majority of published opinions
in this area are those denying motions for services under the CJA. Post-Ake
courts, rather than erring on the side of providing the defendant with the
requested services as basic tools, simply deny the claim if they believe the
defendant does not have a plausible defense.3 5
One of the few lower federal court decisions that successfully rely on the
CJA and provide insightful incorporation of Ake's definition of an indigent's
right to experts is United States v. Crews.3 6 In Crews, the defendant was
admitted to a Veterans Administration hospital and while there threatened to

317. See, e.g., United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d 1360, 1362 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied
andjudgment vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990); United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 467
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 839 (1987).
318. 871 F.2d 635 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982 (1989).
319. Id. at 637. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court should not have asked whether the
defendant was likely to be able to prove he actually suffered from a mental condition but whether
evidence of mental condition would have been a viable defense. Id. at 640.
320. One of the post-Ake cases that recognizes the need for an independent psychiatrist under the
Act is United States v. Vachon, 869 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1989). In a straightforward attempt to level the
playing field, the trial court granted the defendant a psychiatric expert and denied a second expert since
the government only relied on one expert of its own. Id. at 659.
321. See Fazzini, 871 F.2d at 640.
322. See, e.g., United States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d 1557, 1564-65 nn.9-10 (11th Cir. 1987).
323. In United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 940 (1994),
the court noted that experts fill an expanded role under the CJA. The Insanity Defense Reform Act
of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4242 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), authorized a mental exam on sanity at the time of
the offense provided notice of intent to rely on insanity is given and the government also moves for the
exam. Under the CIA, however, the mental health expert "fills a different role," and requests for
experts should be granted if necessary for adequate protection.
324. Williams, 998 F.2d at 264.
325. Rinchack, 820 F.2d at 1564.
326. 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1986).
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kill former President Reagan. 3"
The lower court appeared to grant a
psychiatrist, but since no psychiatrist was apparently available locally, the trial
proceeded without expert assistance for the defense.3" On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit reversed, stating that an Ake-mandated, government-funded psychiatrist
for the defense was the right of an indigent defendant and that the 3 CJA
was
29
essential to assist counsel for the defendant in preparing the defense.
b. Nonpsychiatric experts under the CJA. In United States v.
Durant,"3 the defendant was convicted of bank robbery in the district court.
Prior to trial, he sought appointment of a government-funded fingerprint expert,
both for purposes of the defense case-in-chief and to help prepare for crossexamining the government's expert.33' On appeal, the defendant claimed the
trial court erred in denying him the government-funded fingerprint expert. The
Second Circuit reversed, stating that
the purpose of the Act, confirmed by its legislative history, is clearly to redress the
imbalance in the criminal process when the resources of the United States Government
are pitted against an indigent defendant.... This does not mean that application for
expert assistance should be granted automatically.... But it does mean that the Act
must not be emasculated by niggardly or inappropriate construction.2

In Durant, the Second Circuit noted that the phrase "necessary to an
adequate defense" in 18 U.S.C. section 3006A(e)333 includes defense preparation
for cross-examination of government witnesses.
In determining whether a nonpsychiatric expert is too unusual or expensive
to merit appointment, consideration should be given to whether the circumstances from which the need arose would usually result in an additional
expense for
33
a fee-paying client. 33 Frivolous claims are to be rejected. 1
Courts are most likely to grant expert services when the request relates to
"pivotal" evidence.33 6 Often, however, the defendant needs the expert merely
because it will help the defendant's case in some lesser but valid measure.
Investigators are one of the types of experts most commonly sought under
the CJA. Often a court will refuse a nonpsychiatric expert if the court believes
that no scientific basis for the theory to be advanced exists. 337 Lower courts
327. Id. The defendant apparently made the threatening statements to a nurse the day after the
television show "The Day After" was aired depicting the fictitious nuclear devastation of Lawrence,
Kansas. Id. at 829. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to four years imprisonment. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 834.
330. 545 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1976).
331. Id. at 826-27.
332. Id. at 827; accord United States v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1984).
333. Durant,545 F.2d at 827.
334. See In the Matter of forma pauperis proceedings, 53 Comp. Gen. 638, 642 (1974).
335. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 791 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding that
request for expert to administer polygraph examination to strengthen relationship between defense
counsel and the defendant was not a valid use of section 3006A(e)).
336. United States v. Sanchez, 912 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1990).
337. See, e.g., United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 919 (8th Cir. 1988). The defendant was charged
with manslaughter while driving while intoxicated. Id. at 918. Defendant disputed his identity as the
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are equally reticent to appoint psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts under the
CJA when cross-examination is perceived to be an adequate substitute.3339
requested in numerous areas including interpreters
Other experts have been
3°
chemists.
and forensic
Transcripts are made available to the indigent under subsection (e) of the
CJA.341 Courts have generally allowed the indigent to be provided with
342
transcripts comparable to those which the government obtains for itself.
This makes good sense. A defendant should not be put at a disadvantage
because of poverty when the government is able to order and obtain a transcript
of prior testimony ("daily transcript") in the same case. Likewise, transcripts
of a previous trial that end in a hung jury or a declaration of a mistrial should
be available on a showing of need based on section 3006A(e) and on Griffin
and its progeny.
3. The Effect of Statutory Case Compensation Maximums for Expert
Services. When appointed counsel has received prior authorization 343 from
the judge for investigative, expert, or other services, compensation for expert
services under the CJA is limited to $1000 .

In 1970, the CJA was amended

to provide for a waiver of the statutory compensation maximum for expert
defense services. 345 Payment in excess of the $1000 limit may now be granted
if a case is one of unusual duration or of a character that requires in fairness
that extra compensation be awarded.3" With the cost of experts on the rise

driver and sought a hypnotist. Id. at 919. The request was denied pursuant to section 3006A(e). Id.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, which held that there was no showing that the
hypnotist could enhance memory lost in an alcoholic blackout. Id.
338. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986).
339. United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
340. United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979).
341. See CJA GUIDELINES, supra note 301, § 3.12A(1) (1993 as amended). Transcripts may be
obtained through the filing of an authorization and voucher for payment, which must be signed by the
district judge. Attorneys who so elect may also obtain reimbursement for transcripts as an out-ofpocket expense. Regardless of which method for payment is used, the limitations of $1000 and $300
for expert services do not apply to the cost of transcripts. Id.
342. See United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019 (1984)
(holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the indigent defendant a daily
transcript when the government had ordered the transcripts for itself); United States v. Scarpa, 691 F.
Supp. 635, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that an indigent defendant can obtain daily transcripts where
government receives the same).
343. Without prior authorization, counsel may seek expert services under the Act for his or her
client provided that the cost of the services does not exceed $300 plus reasonable expenses. See CJA
GUIDELINES, supra note 301, § 3.02B.
344. See id. § 3.02A. There is no limit in federal capital cases and federal habeas corpus proceedings.
345. H.R. REP. No. 91-1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3982, at
3991.
346. An example of the type of case in which the $1000 maximum will not be waived is United
States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990). In Gossett, the
defendant was charged with murder and mutiny on the high seas and had been granted an independent
investigator. Id. at 903. The defendant sought investigative services in excess of the $1000 limit to track
a transient witness. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the request was not
reasonable and that it did not require a waiver of the type contemplated by the Act. Id. at 903-04.
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and the large number of hours that may be required of an appointed expert in
preparation and presentation of the defense, the waiver provision is absolutely
essential. Generally, trial courts tend to resist granting waivers and often make
the determinations
of fee awards and waivers of the maximum on an ad hoc
7
34

basis.

Defendants may also be required to repay expenses for expert services or
counsel. In Hanson v. Passer,3" the defendant sought court-appointed counsel
on a charge of selling alcohol to a minor and was ordered to pay $1000 prior to
the receipt of counsel. The Eighth Circuit held that a defendant may be
required to repay expenses incurred in preparing a defense provided that
indigents are forever exempt. 3 9
When funds are allocated for expert services under the CJA, the services are
"defense" services when the defendant selects the expert and controls the
disclosure of the expert's report. If experts are used and payment is from
another source, the court or the government selects the expert and persons
other than the defendant have access to the expert's report.
B. State Statutes Authorizing Defense Services
A majority of states provide indigent defendants with the assistance of a
psychiatrist in certain circumstances. 3 ° States provide expert defense services
to indigent defendants either by reimbursement or direct provision of funds,"'
by court appointment of an expert,352 or by funding the state's public defender
347. See Martin v. Dugger, 708 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 1989). The court granted the three
medical experts each $1000 plus expenses, apparently on the grounds that each testified for less than
one day. Although the services could not have been obtained without prior authorization, the court
would not waive the statutory limit. Id.
348. 13 F.3d 275 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1859 (1994).
349. I&
350. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-79 n.4 (1985) (listing forty states that make expert defense
assistance available to indigent defendants).
351. See, e.g., ILL. COIP. STAT. ch. 725 § 5/113-3 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994) (funding for
expert defense assistance for capital cases only is not to exceed $250); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 31.070
(Baldwin 1992) (fees plus expenses for defense is not to exceed $1000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21(b)
(West Supp. 1994) ($1000 limit on compensation paid for expert defense services); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 7.135 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993) (reimbursement for expenses for expert services is not to
exceed $300 unless authorized by the court); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A: 6 (Supp. 1993) (the court
may authorize counsel to obtain necessary services exceeding $300); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 (c)
(McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1994) (court may authorize counsel to obtain necessary services, not to exceed
$300 unless extraordinary); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(a) (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1994)
(a reasonable fee may be set by the court for investigation and expert testimony); see also HAW. REV.
STAT. § 802-7 (Michie 1994) (funding for expert defense services is to be paid from available court
funds); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1994) (at court's discretion, approval may be
given for fees for the service of expert witnesses); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.055(3) (1990) (reasonable
expenses for expert defense services, in the discretion of the court, may be authorized); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (1990 & Supp. 1993) (where expert defense services are determined to be necessary
in a capital case, court can authorize appropriate services).
352. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.070 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993) (upon notice of a defendant's
intent to use the insanity defense, the court will appoint two qualified psychiatrists); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1989 & Supp. 1993) (psychiatric experts are court appointed, and available for
capital cases only) (extended to noncapital cases in State v. Peeler, 126 Ariz. 254, 614 P.2d 335 (Ariz.
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and legal aid programs.353 These services are legislatively imposed and are,
enforced than in states where the trial courts act at
therefore, more consistently
354
their own discretion.
Perhaps a way around caps placed on expert and investigative services is for
a state court to declare that the caps are not absolute allowances, but rather are
limitations on state funds allocated for the defense of indigents. Counties would
then be required to supplement state funds as required to ensure competent
representation in any given case. The determination of the amount of county
funds to be required in a given case would rest in the sound discretion of the
trial court. This was the approach taken recently by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Bailey v. State.355 In Bailey, the court held that the South
Carolina statute providing for caps of $5000 for attorney's fees and $2500 for
experts and investigative services in capital cases were only state caps and that
counties throughout the state would have to supplement these fee and expert
service caps as necessary in a given case.3 56 As to the trial court's discretion,
the Bailey court indicated that the court should approve such reasonable
expenses as would be plainly necessary for the defendant to have his day in
court and to permit counsel to fairly and adequately present his case.357
1980)); see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (upon notice of intent to use the
insanity defense, the court must appoint defense experts); IND. STAT. ANN. § 35-36-2-2 (Bums 1994 &
Supp. 1994) (upon notice of a defendant's intent to use the insanity defense, the court will appoint two
or three "competent disinterested" psychiatrists or clinical psychologists to examine the defendant and
testify at trial); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-202(1) (1993) (upon notice of the defendant's intent to use
the insanity defense, the court will appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or licensed clinical
psychologist to examine the defendant); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Banks-Baldwin 1992 Supp.
1993) (examiners are appointed by the court, but the defendant may recommend a preferred examiner
if more than one examination is ordered).
353. DEL. CODE ANN. 29 §§ 4601-4608. (1991 & Supp. 1994) (creating a public defender's office);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:158A-1-:158A-25 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (creating a public defender's office);
W. VA. CODE § 29-21-13a(c) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994) (providing for reimbursement of up to $1500
for expenses incurred by public defenders or panel attorneys for expert witnesses); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 977.01-.10 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (creating a public defender's office).
354. See, e.g., State v. Olin, 648 P.2d 203 (Idaho 1982) (acknowledging that a defendant's request
for expert services should be measured against due process standards, the court nonetheless held that
whether or not a particular defendant is entitled to expert defense assistance at state expense is in the
discretion of the trial court); State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255 (Me. 1983) (retreating from earlier standard
which provided an indigent defendant with expert defense assistance whenever a reasonable attorney
would engage an expert, and adopting a requirement that the indigent defendant demonstrate to the
trial court that his need for psychiatric defense assistance is essential or necessary to an adequate
defense); Collins v. State, 288 A.2d 221, 224 (Md.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 882 (1972) ("[T]he majority
of jurisdictions, including Maryland, have held that the supplying of expert pretrial services to indigent
defendants in criminal cases at public expense is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court.").
355. 424 S.E.2d 503 (S.C. 1992).
356. The court noted that the per-hour rate of $15 for in-court time and $10 for out-of-court time
were the lowest in the nation. Id at 508 n.4.
357. Id at 509 (citing Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Ark. 1991)). In Arnold, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas struck down the state statutory expense and fee cap as being unconstitutional on
both equal protection grounds (Arkansas is a "mixed" state where some counties have public defenders
and some counties proceed with private or panel attorneys for the representation of indigent
defendants) and the fact that statutory expenses and fee caps imposed on court-appointed attorneys for
individual clients accused of crimes was excessive and constituted a "taking" of property in violation
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VI
IMPLEMENTING AKE IN THE 1990S-RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Suggested Statutory Language for Authorization of Defense Services
The cases discussed in Parts III, IV, and V of this article generally suggest
a number of after-the-fact tests to aid appellate courts in deciding whether a
defendant is entitled to a new trial based on a trial court's denial of an expert.
Such tests include whether the requested expert's testimony would have been
admissible on a pivotal issue so as to bear on the defendant's innocence;
whether other independent evidence supports the defendant's guilt (a "harmless
error" test); whether any expert offered testimony on the issue; whether the
lawyer could have performed the work he sought an expert to do; whether the
lawyer exhibited competence in dealing with a government expert; and whether
the request made by counsel for the defendant was timely.
It is apparent that much more guidance is needed at the trial court level,
where the judge must decide in the first instance whether an expert for a
defendant should be allowed. There simply is not enough protection in the due
process/fundamental fairness/right to assistance of counsel standards.
Reviewing the record to determine whether fundamental fairness was
accorded to an indigent defendant after the trial has been completed ignores the
purpose of section 3006A(e) of the CJA and comparable state statutes, which
is to provide the defendant and his counsel with knowledge to use at trial. As
the Second Circuit has stated:
We have given serious consideration to merely remanding for appointment of an
expert whose report could then be considered by the trial court or by us in deciding
whether to grant a new trial. But we believe this misconceives the purpose of
providing expert service to the defense. It is not to supply either the trial or appellate
court with
anything, but to furnish defense counsel expert information to use as he
358
sees fit.

Moreover, it is virtually impossible to decide before trial whether denial of an
expert will deny a defendant fundamental fairness." 9
Thus, where a reasonably competent attorney in good faith requests defense
services, such request should be granted. A trial judge need not act in a
vacuum; the court can require a motion and affidavit showing need. However,
where defense counsel can articulate specific and affirmative facts on which he
bases the belief that a certain expert is warranted or would be helpful to the
defense, the motion should be granted. This is basically the standard

of the 14th Amendment. 813 S.W.2d at 772-76; see also DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d
437 (Alaska 1987); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986); State ex rel. Stephan v.
Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1986).
358. United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1976).
359. Id.
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formulated by Judge Wisdom in United States v. Theriault.36° Judge Wisdom's
standard has been embraced by both federal and state courts. 361 If this
standard were uniformly adopted, it would eliminate the showing of "necessity"
and shift the burden of making the decision from the court to defense counsel.
Proposed federal and state statutory wording could be as follows:
A defendant who has been qualified to proceed as an indigent in a
criminal case and who is unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other
services for his defense may request them in an ex parte application to
the court filed by defense counsel. The court shall authorize defense
counsel to obtain services on behalf of the defendant when:
(A) (1) there is a timely request by defense counsel, accompanied
by a motion and affidavit setting forth specific facts and reasons
why the request is necessary or helpful to an adequate defense; or
(2) whenever the government has indicated by pretrial discovery
or at a pretrial conference that it will be offering the testimony of
an expert, and the defense deems it appropriate to retain a defense
expert to testify as to the same facts or legal issue; and
(B) the court makes a finding that the defendant is financially
unable to obtain the requested defense services; and
(C) defense counsel certifies that the case is one that will result, or
is likely to result, in a contested trial.362
If this proposed statutory language were enacted, defense counsel would be
forced to allege specific facts to support the belief that a defense expert is
necessary. Trial courts then would have considerably more information on
which to make an informed ruling, and appellate courts would have a more
complete and better record to review for abuse of discretion. This does not
mean that frivolous motions should be entertained seriously, but only that a trial
court should give meaning to the right of an indigent defendant to the effective
assistance of counsel. That is, effective counsel will do what is necessary to
represent his client properly by filing a detailed and fact-specific motion for
defense services, and the trial court will honor good faith representations made
by defense counsel.3"
360. 440 F.2d 713,716-17 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring). In Theriault,Judge Wisdom read
the legislative history and policy basis of section 3006A(e) to compel the conclusion that "authorization
for defense services [is required] when the attorney makes a reasonable request in circumstances in
which he would independently engage such services if his client had the financial means to support his
defenses." Id. at 717.
361. See, e.g., United States v. Alden, 767 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sims, 617
F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980); Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 509-510 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Chavis, 486 F.2d 1290, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 1987);
State ex reL Foster v. Luff, 264 S.E.2d 477, 479 (W. Va. 1980).
362. A statutory proposal somewhat similar to the one recommended in this article was made in 1982
in an article on expert services. See John F. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases:
The Constitutionaland Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 574, 614-15 (1982).
363. Statutory provisions should also be made to provide government- or state-funded experts for
use at sentencing, as opposed to trials. This would enable defendants to develop mitigating facts at
sentencing, an especially acute need in death penalty cases.
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Indigent defendants will be able to compete with the prosecution in cases
where fact investigation and/or expert witnesses will decide the outcome of trial
only by a shift away from after-the-fact tests to determine whether a defendant
was prejudiced by a denial of expert services and toward more progressive
legislation in the area of granting defense services, and by more state supreme
court holdings striking 'down fee and expense caps as unconstitutional. In short,
the "tools of an adequate defense ' , 31 lose validity when they are inaccessible
to defense attorneys.
B. Interpreting the "Significant Factor at Trial" Test in Terms of
Reasonableness
Based on a review of lower court decisions since Ake, it is clear that Ake's
promise of attaining "[m]eaningful access to justice ''31 for indigent defendants
has not been fully realized. This lack of attainment looms large, in light of the
frequency with which the issue of the right to expert services for indigent
defendants arises in capital cases and the increasing importance of expert
assistance in all criminal cases. 3 6 The question, then, remains: How should
lower courts implement Ake?
If one views the issue in the larger context of what the Supreme Court
attempted to accomplish in Ake, the standard articulated in Moore v. Kemp3 67
and other variants of the Moore test seem overly strict. While the right
announced in Ake was based on the due process clause, the opinion itself
contains much language in the area of equalizing justice between the rich and
poor.3" Thus, the Moore standard has the exact opposite effect.
A reasonableness standard, similar to that adopted in Sommers v. Commonwealth,369 would fully satisfy the policy objectives of Ake. In Sommers the
court had to interpret the word "necessary" in a state statute providing for
expert services to an indigent accused of a crime. The court held that a
defendant's request for the use of an expert witness in preparation of his
defense must be measured by a standard of reasonableness and should be
allowed when the facts show that use of the expert would be "reasonably
necessary" to the accused in preparing his case.37 Unlike Moore, Sommers

364. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
365. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
366. ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES iii (3d ed. 1986)

(noting that scientific evidence and expert testimony are increasingly vital in criminal investigations and
trials as a consequence of increasing specialization of knowledge and problem solving).
367. 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987); see supra note 137.
368. See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 76-77.
369. 843 S.W.2d 879, 882-85 (Ky. 1992).
370. Id. at 883; accord Vassar v. Solem, 763 F.2d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 1985). Commentators have
suggested similar standards. See Harris, supra note 91, at 781 (stating that a "reasonableness standard,
akin to that adopted in Vassar ...would fulfill the underlying policy objectives of Ake"); William D.
Auman, Note, Criminal Procedure-Defendant'sDue Process Right to a Psychiatric Expert-Ake v.
Oklahoma, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 323, 334 (1986) (Because insanity is a potentially dispositive defense,
"the requirement of a preliminary showing in Ake should be construed in a flexible manner to recognize
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does not require that the defendant prove prejudice or lack of a fair trial
without the use of the expert. Moreover, the reasonableness standard is
consistent with the rationale of Ake that a court should presume a trial would
be unfair if the defendant does not receive expert assistance when the
defendant's sanity is a significant factor. Whereas Moore, which requires that
a defendant prove the trial will be fundamentally unfair, is not consistent with
the Ake rationale.
In contrast to the rigid requirements of Moore, construing Ake in terms of
reasonableness would give lower courts flexibility to respond to the facts.
Under the Sommers reasonableness standard, a lower court would view Ake by
allowing defendants to receive help in those cases in which a defense expert's
testimony (or aid in preparing a cross-examination) relates to a reasonably
significant factor at trial, even if this would result in some defendants with
marginally justified expert requests receiving assistance. The reasonableness
standard would also recognize that the motion for expert assistance must be
made before trial, during early stages of investigation and factual development.
VII
CONCLUSION

More than sixty years ago, the Supreme Court determined that the assistance
of counsel was constitutionally mandated."' Almost forty years ago, a free
transcript was deemed necessary to preserve an indigent's constitutional
rights.372 Ten years ago, with Ake in 1985, expert psychiatric assistance was
recognized as a necessary incident to a fair trial.373 Since Ake, a number of
state courts have struck down fee and expert services caps either as not being
absolute maximums or as being unconstitutional.374 This progression represents a continuing redefinition of the adequate tools that must be furnished to
an indigent defendant in order to meet constitutional standards.
Experts, both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric, are an integral part of today's
complex trials at both the federal and state level. Ake suggested that when the
issue to be addressed by an expert would be a significant issue at trial or
necessary to an adequate defense, the expert presumptively was necessary. Ake
dealt solely with the indigent's right to a psychiatric expert. However, an
analysis of Ake and its constitutional underpinnings suggests that the Ake
mandate logically should extend to the nonpsychiatric expert as well. Unfortu-

and reflect the public concern of a fair and accurate resolution of issues."); Craig Bowman, Note, The
Indigent'sRight to an Adequate Defense: Expert and InvestigationalAssistance in CriminalProceedings,
55 CORNELL L. REv. 632, 644 (1970) ("The most reasonable formula is to provide ... services.., at
public expense to the extent that a refusal of funds in a particular case will work undue hardship on
the defendant.").
371. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
372. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
373. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
374. See supra notes 355-57 and accompanying text.
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nately, most post-Ake lower federal and state courts have been miserly when
evaluating nonpsychiatric expert requests made by indigent defendants.375
New legislation liberalizing the standards for ruling on such defense motions
is needed, as is a broader interpretation of Ake by the courts. Given the
sophisticated, complex trials of today, an indigent defendant denied expert
assistance cannot be said to have an adequate defense. More than sixty years
ago, then Chief Justice Cardozo of the Court of Appeals of New York penned
words that have even greater meaning today: "[U]pon the trial of certain issues
.. experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense ....[A]
defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty
to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him. ' ,37 6 The
indigent defendant must be provided the necessary tools with which to defend
adequately against the power of the prosecution; otherwise the Ake mandate is
meaningless. In the absence of a more fixed duty on trial courts to provide
independent experts for the indigent, it is likely that the type of trial an accused
will receive will sadly depend on the depth of his or her pocket.

375. Since Ake was handed down, only two courts have found the denial of a nonpsychiatric expert
to be a denial of due process. In Little v. Armontrout, .the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant's
fourteenth amendment right to due process was violated when the trial court refused to appoint a
hypnotist for him. 835 F.2d 1240, 1242-45 (1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). In State
v. Coker, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a
motion for an expert to assist Coker in the preparation of an intoxication defense. 412 N.W.2d 589
(1987). Other courts have, however, reversed convictions and granted a new trial where experts were
denied at the trial court level based on the trial court's erroneous interpretation of state law. See
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); see also Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879 (Ky.
1992).
376. Reilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929).

